SummaryIn 1931 the Royal Commission an Licensing concluded that the drink problem was no longer a ‘gigantic evil’. Measured by the reduction in per capita consumption, the resolution of ‘the drink question’ took place mainly in the early years of the twentieth century. This paper contrast*the respective fortune*of the temperance movement and the drink trade*and argues that before 1900 the drink trades displayed little concern about the anti‐drink campaign. Only after 1900 when total demand fell and a wider range, of policy options were proposed, did the drink trades read. Even so, the anti‐drink campaigners greatly overestimated the economic, political and social influence of the drink interest. Business records affirms and trade associations in the Scotch whisky industry show that it was not until ‘the People’ Budbget’ of 1909 which increased excise duty on spirits that the industry began to subscribe to the Conservative party and to attempt to influence shareholders and employees. With the First World War, stringent controls on drink consumption and production were proposed but in direct negotiations with the Government whisky producers were able to modify the proposals. Patent still distillers met a national need far munitions spirit and yeast. Nationalization of the drink industry was not supported by the whisky trade, in contrast to the brewing industry. After the war, Scotch wins by producers continued to see the anti‐drink campaign, especially prohibition, as a threat and developed more effective means of defence. How relevant trade defence and legislation were to the resolution of the drink question remains doubtful as underlying cultural changes altered the use made of leisure time and the distribution of c