THE ANALYST. 167 KING’S BENCH DIVISION. (Before the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND, Mr. JUSTICE DARLING, and Mr. JUSTICE CHANNELL.) BAYLEY v. PEARKS, GUNSTON, AND TEE (LIMITED). From the L b Times,” May 1, 1902. THIS was an appeal by way of special case from a decision of three justices for the county of Southampton dismissing an information laid by the appellant against the respondent company under Section 8 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899, charging them with selling to the appellant a quantity of margarine the fat of which contained more than 10 per cent. of butter fat. The substance in question was ‘‘ Pearks’ milk-blended butter,’’ and was sold as such, with a label stating that it was “ choistest butter blended with pure English full-cream milk, whereby the percentage of water in the butter is increased to about 24 per cent.” The usual proceedings under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts were gone through.The analyst’s certificate which was put in stated that the substance contained 73-35 per cent. fat, 23.30 per cent. water, 2.55 per cent. lard, and 1.80 per cent. salt, and that the ‘‘ butter ” was adulterated with excess of water to the extent of 7.3 per cent. He proved that the 72.35 was butter fat, and was the only fat present; that the texture of this butter differentiated it from ordinary butter ; lie was sure there had been a secondary manufactwe, and that, in his opinion, it was a compound article; it was not adulterated with any other substance than water. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that this milk-blended butter was mar- garine, and must be dealt with under the Margarine Acts. I t was not the substance usually known as butter, but was compounded of certain ingredients-namely, butter properly so called and milk unconverted into butter, and underwent a second process of manufacturing.I t was made by mixing two kinds of butter together by means of adding milk or cream. I t was a mixed article and made in imitation of butter, and came within the definition of margarine in Section 3 of the Margarine Act, 1887. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the The analyst was called as a witness.168 THE ANALYST. article was butter, that it was admitted to be two butters blended together and could not be called an imitation of butter. That margarine was made from beef fat or some other like sub- stance, and that if mixed with butter became margarine ; but that it could not be contended that two butters mixed together became margarine or were anything else than butter.That the article came within the definition of butter in Section 3 of the Margarine Act, 1887. That the article was made exclusively from milk or cream only, and no other substance whatever was mixed with it. The justices were of opinion that the article in question was not margarine as defined by the Margarine Act, 1887, and they dismissed the information, subject to the present case. Mr. DANCKWERTS, K.C. (with whom was Mr. Emmanuel), contended that the substance was “ margarine ” within the meaning of the Margarine Act, 1887, by reason of the definition of “ margarine ” in Section 3 of that Act.This definition was incorporated into the Act of 18%. The substance therefore came within the prohibition in Section 8 of that Act against selling margarine of which the fat contains more than 10 per cent. of butter fat. Mr. ASQUITII, K.C.(with whom were Mr. Macmorran, K.C., Mr. Frampton, and Mr. Ricardo), contended that the substance was not margarine within Section 8 of the Act of 1899. I t was not necessary to read into that section the definition in the Act of 1887 in all its amplitude. Further, the substance was not ‘‘ margarine ” within the definition in the Act of 1887. It was butter within the definition of butter in that Act. True, if a purchaser asked for butter simply, this substance would not be sold to him without explanation, because it was not the ordinary butter the purchaser must be taken to demand.But it did not follow it was not butter within the definition of the Act of 1887. The court dismissed the appeal. The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, in giving judgment, said that the information was for selling margarine the fat of which contained more than 10 per cent. of butter fat. The magistrates had dealt with the information by holding that the substance sold was not margarine. The force of Mr. Danckwerts’ argument rested upon the following facts : When the Legislature enacted Section 8 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1889, it used the word “ margarine.” There was in the Margarine Act, 1887, a definition clause enacting that ‘‘ ‘ margarine ’ shall mean all substances, whether compounds or otherwise, prepared in imitation of butter, and whether mixed with butter or not, and no such substance shall be lawfully sold, except under the pame of margarine, and under the conditions set forth in this Act.” By Section 25 of the Act of 1899 expressions in that Act were to have the same meaning as in the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts and by Section 28 of that Act the Margarine Act, 1887, was included among these Acts.Mr. Danckwerts had contended that the expression ‘‘ margarine ” must include the substance now in question, because the definition from the Act of 1887 had to be applied, and, since it was prepared in imitation of butter, it could only be sold under the name of margarine, and being margarine could not be sold at all if it contained more than 10 per cent. of butter fat.The answer was that, looking at the Act of 1899, it was quite plain that the Act did contemplate certain things which, according to this argument, ought to be called margarine, and yet which were called by a different name. I n Section 1 of the Act, “ adulterated or impoverished butter (other than margarine) ” was referred to as one of the articles which was not to be imported except upon certain conditions. I t would follow, if Mr. Danckwerts’ argument was right, that if impoverished butter was imported it could only be sold as margarine, and that it could not be sold at all if it contained more than 10 per cent. of butter fat. That was the logical result of the argument. I t was butter mixed with milk, and it could not be sold as butter because of Section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875. But it might be sold under that Act with a proper protective label. Now, it was contended that it could not be sold at all because it contained more than 10 per cent. of butter fat, and had been made (‘ margarine ” by Act of Parliament. He thought it was The facts as to the substance in question in the case were perfectly well known.THE ANALYST. 169 butter and milk mixed together, and he found nothing to compel him to say that butter and milk mixed was not to be sold except as margarine, or, what was more important, was not to be sold at all. He thought the magistrates were perfectly right ; the substance was not margarine, but butter and milk. Mr. JUSTICE DARLING and Mr. JUSTICE CHANNELL delivered judgment to the same effect.