Three-level incentive schemes using follower's strategies in differential games
作者:
TSUTOMU ISHIDA,
期刊:
International Journal of Control
(Taylor Available online 1987)
卷期:
Volume 46,
issue 5
页码: 1739-1750
ISSN:0020-7179
年代: 1987
DOI:10.1080/00207178708934006
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
We deal with three-level incentive differential games in which first and second leaders have access not only to slate information but also to information on follower's strategies. We derive sufficient conditions for three-level incentive schemes using information on follower's strategies in both linear and non-linear differential games, and show that three-level incentive schemes using information on follower's strategies depend on an initial state value.
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