Conflicting Intuitions about Causality1
作者:
PATRICK SUPPES,
期刊:
Midwest Studies In Philosophy
(WILEY Available online 1984)
卷期:
Volume 9,
issue 1
页码: 151-168
ISSN:0363-6550
年代: 1984
DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00057.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
In this article I examine five kinds of conflicting intuitions about the nature of causality. The viewpoint is that of a probabilistic theory of causality, which I think is the right general framework for examining causal questions. It is not the purpose of this article to defend the general thesis in any depth but many of the particular points I make are meant to offer new lines of defense of such a probabilistic theory. To provide a conceptual framework for the analysis, I review briefly the more systematic aspects of the sort of probabilistic theory of causality I advocate. I first define the three notions of prima facie cause, spurious cause, and genuine cause. The technical details are worked out in an earlier monograph (Suppes 1970) and are not repeated.
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