Sufficient conditions for Nash strategies in a class of non-zero-sum differential games†
作者:
NICHOLASJ. KRIKELIS,
期刊:
International Journal of Control
(Taylor Available online 1972)
卷期:
Volume 16,
issue 6
页码: 1121-1126
ISSN:0020-7179
年代: 1972
DOI:10.1080/00207177208932344
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
A general class of two-person differential games, where the first player tries to minimize a cost criterion, while the second tries to maximize a different cost functional, by controlling inputs to a single dynamic system, is investigated as an extension of optimal control theory. Using variational techniques, sufficient conditions for open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are developed.
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