AbstractThis paper reports the results of research aimed at exploring why some takeover bids give rise to merger while other do not and, using as a basis of comparison matched samples of actual and abandoned mergers, the performance effects of mergers. In this work, 50 cases of abandoned mergers occurring between 1965 and 1975 were analysed against a matched sample of 50 actual mergers. In addition, 33 cases of contested bids were also analysed. Variables used reflected managerial, shareholder and financial strength considerations. Analysis covered a period three years before to three years after each bid. Techniques of analysis were differences of means and discriminant analysis. The results show that there are important differences between target companies that are acquired and those that successfully resist takeover bids. They also show the influence of managerial and financial variables as the key to a successful takeover bid rather than variables reflecting shareholder interests. Analysis of the effects of the outcome of the bids suggests that companies involved in abandoned mergers recorded a stronger performance over the subsequent 1–3 years than those that made acquisitions, especially where shareholder and financial considerations are concerned. Target companies that resisted takeover bids showed a significant performance improvemen