New product introduction under demand uncertainty in competitive industries
作者:
Rabikar Chatterjee,
Yoshi Sugita,
期刊:
Managerial and Decision Economics
(WILEY Available online 1990)
卷期:
Volume 11,
issue 1
页码: 1-12
ISSN:0143-6570
年代: 1990
DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110102
出版商: John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
AbstractA game‐theoretic model is employed to examine the conditions under which firms in a duopoly, faced with a new product introduction opportunity of uncertain profitability (because of uncertainty in demand), choose to enter the market immediately or, alternatively, decide to wait, thereby avoiding the risk of failure. The implications for a firm's strategic behavior are contrasted with situations in which the competitor is believed to be (1) passive, implying that the firm expects to enjoy indefinite monopoly status if it introduces the new product, and (2) committed to a waiting strategy, implying monopoly status for a limited time period, if the new product is successfu
点击下载:
PDF
(1042KB)
返 回