SUMMARY.Agricultural price stabilisation schemes are no innovation thrown up to counter the effects of the 1930–1932 slump; further, neither economic unsoundness nor administrative failure prevents the replanting of a scheme that has wilted or died. Such schemes are forced upon Governments by the innate insecurity and poor capital resources of agriculture, bý the accelerated effect of scientific and technical advance on productive capacity and bý the repercussions of economic nationalism and government intervention.Agricultural price stabilisation may also help the industrial “producerconsumer” if it steadies agricultural purchasing power, if it. stimulates the farmer to greater efficiency, and if it ensures steadier food prices.Price stabilisation devices fall into four man classes:a. Regulation of the volume of demand;b. Redation of the volume of Supply;c. Maintenance of prices(e.g.“price pegging”) by the trading, loan, stock‐holding or other, financial “shock‐absorbing” operations of a statutory or collictive body;d. Fixing “statutory”, or official prices and con'ditions of sale and providing the necessary administrative machinery for enforcement.Examples of the main types in each of these four groups are given and the peculiar difficulties (compared with industry) of price fixing in agriculture are outlined, viz., (a) adequate supply control, (b) variations in the quality and perishability of products, (c) poor capital and credit facilities of farmers, and (d) the small size but wide (geographical) scatter of typical farm enterprises and the resultant problems of administration, public relations and evasion.The types of difficulty, viz., (i) and (ii) errors in, forecasting supply and demand, (iii) evasion, (iv) over‐optimistic finance and stock‐holding policies; and (v) opposition of vested and disaffected interests, experienced in the practice of price stabilisation are then discussed and some of the fundamental problems which underly them‐(a) collective versus individual risk bearing; (b) elastic versus inelastic structure; (c) secrecy versus publicity; (d) equity between the constituent sections of an industry and the community are outlined.Some tentative conclusions, which might form the basis for a discussion on a list of “do's and don'ts” for the guidante of those ŕesporisible for the design and administration or agricultural price