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Belief, Knowledge and the Origins of Content

 

作者: Samuel Guttenplan,  

 

期刊: Dialectica  (WILEY Available online 1994)
卷期: Volume 48, issue 3‐4  

页码: 287-305

 

ISSN:0012-2017

 

年代: 1994

 

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1994.tb00151.x

 

出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

 

数据来源: WILEY

 

摘要:

SummaryVirtually all discussions of the propositional attitudes centre around belief. I suggest that, when one takes a broad look at the kinds of constraint which affect our attributions of attitude, this is a mistake. Not only is belief not properly representative of the propositional attitudes generally, but, more seriously, taking it to be representative can be positively distorting. In this paper I offer reasons why we should give knowledge a more central role in discussions of the propositional attitudes and suggest that its almost complete neglect in current philosophy of mind is unjustified. In essence, I argue that we should consider knowledge to be the central attitude and think of belief as a later and special development of the attitude scheme. In place of the usual explanation of knowledge as belief plus something, we should think of belief as knowledge minus something. The final sections choose Kripke's puzzle about belief as an example of where the conventional wisdom leads us astray.

 

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