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BANK CAPITAL FORBEARANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

 

作者: GEORGE G. KAUFMAN,  

 

期刊: Contemporary Economic Policy  (WILEY Available online 1987)
卷期: Volume 5, issue 1  

页码: 84-91

 

ISSN:1074-3529

 

年代: 1987

 

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00248.x

 

出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

 

数据来源: WILEY

 

摘要:

Recently, the bank regulatory agencies have adopted capital forbearance programs to permit some troubled agriculture and energy banks to operate temporarily with capital levels below the regulatory minimum requirement. In a world with federal deposit insurance and a lender of last resort, bank capital is no longer viewed by all depositors as the primary protector of their funds. Thus, they reduce their market discipline. Bank owners/ managers are likely to respond by increasing their risk exposure in an attempt to regain profitability. If they win, they keep all the gains; if they lose, the losses are passed on to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). A preferred policy is to require these banks to raise additional capital at this time or to be sold. Capital forbearance is forbearance of incumbent bank management/owners, not of bank customers.

 

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