HOW TO BEAT A SCEPTIC WITHOUT BEGGING THE QUESTION
作者:
John Greco,
期刊:
Ratio
(WILEY Available online 1993)
卷期:
Volume 6,
issue 1
页码: 1-15
ISSN:0034-0006
年代: 1993
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1993.tb00048.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
AbstractIn this paper I offer a solution to scepticism about the world which neither embraces idealism, nor ends in a stalemate, nor begs the question against the sceptic. In the first part of the paper I explicate the sceptical argument and try to show why it has real force. In the next part of the paper I propose a version of the relevant possibilities approach to scepticism. The central claim of the proposed solution is that a sceptical possibility undermines knowledge only if the possibility is true in some close possible world. But since there is no reason to believe that I am deceived by an evil demon or that I am a brain in a vat in some close possible world, there is no reason to accept an essential premise of the sceptical argument, i.e. that the sceptical scenarios are relevant possibilities. Finally, I argue that the solution proposed does not embrace idealism, end in a stalemate, or beg the question.
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