Macroeconomic productivity in Israel is here conceived as comparison of output with factor inputs during given periods, and as creation of sustained capacity out of given resource increments. However, present social accounting practice prevents full implementation of this second approach.In contrast to nine European countries, only one third of the rapid growth rate of Israel in 1950–1965 is “explained” by the “Residual” because of relatively large infrastructural investments and of growth problems. One of these problems is inflationary pressures which caused productivity increases to restrain the rise of product prices by 30 per cent only below the rise of input prices. The real productivity gain accrued, in Israel and in the U.S.A. (1919–1957), nearly fully to labor because unit returns to capital remained constant whereas those to labor sharply rose.Some refinements of the statistical models are attempted by incorporating the utilization rates of labor and capital (for industry); and by measuring product from the uses, instead of from the income, side, adding the differences to the capital shares. This makes distributive factor shares nearly constant as postulated by Cobb‐Douglas.In order to get a basis for appraising efficiency in creating long‐term capacity, that part of product increments is measured which represents rises of p.c. final domestic uses and changes in the export surplus. This “net margin” formed in Israel one fifth and in the U.S.A. (1889–1913) much less of incremental product. Though in Israel one quarter, and in the U.S.A. over half (in 1919–1953) of the net margin went into sonsumption, large proportions of it presumably actually created human capacity. A comparison of product growth rates with population growth, and of the breakdown of the resulting p.c. product growth rates into full final uses, for Israel and two groups, of developed and less developed countries in the fifties shows,inter‐alia, that in the L.D.C. only small proportions of their presumable capacity creation was financed by net capital inflows, thus imposing upon them domestic saving rates which presumably are t