The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing
作者:
JohnO. Ledyard,
期刊:
Journal of Organizational Computing
(Taylor Available online 1993)
卷期:
Volume 3,
issue 1
页码: 121-134
ISSN:1054-1721
年代: 1993
DOI:10.1080/10919399309540197
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
关键词: assignment problem;mechanism design;incentive compatibility;cooperation;experimental economics
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
We provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions.
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