WELFARE AND MONETARY PRECOMMITMENT IN AN ECONOMY WITH MENU COSTS AND UNIONIZED WAGE SETTING
作者:
Robin P. Cubitt,
期刊:
Bulletin of Economic Research
(WILEY Available online 1993)
卷期:
Volume 45,
issue 1
页码: 7-17
ISSN:0307-3378
年代: 1993
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8586.1993.tb00552.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
ABSTRACTThe paper shows that monetary precommitment can be advantageous to the government in a macroeconomic policy game where (i) the government's objectives are explicitly derived from those of the citizens, (ii) inflation has a real cost and (iii) the suboptimality of the output level arises from the structure of the private sector rather than from fiscal policy. It suggests that, to this extent, welfare interpretations of game theoretic monetary policy models are coherent.
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