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Incentive Contracts and Price Differential Acceptance Tests

 

作者: BettyJ. Flehinger,   James Miller,  

 

期刊: Journal of the American Statistical Association  (Taylor Available online 1964)
卷期: Volume 59, issue 305  

页码: 149-159

 

ISSN:0162-1459

 

年代: 1964

 

DOI:10.1080/01621459.1964.10480708

 

出版商: Taylor & Francis Group

 

数据来源: Taylor

 

摘要:

It may be economically advantageous to both consumer and producer to enter into an incentive type contract in which the price paid for a product depends upon the outcome of an acceptance test. If no test is performed, a product of some minimum quality is produced and the consumer suffers a considerable penalty. The outcome of the test will reflect, to some degree, the quality of the product. If the consumer agrees to pay a premium dependent upon the outcome, the producer will be motivated to invest money in improving his product and both parties may expect to profit from the arrangement.

 

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