Incentive Contracts and Price Differential Acceptance Tests
作者:
BettyJ. Flehinger,
James Miller,
期刊:
Journal of the American Statistical Association
(Taylor Available online 1964)
卷期:
Volume 59,
issue 305
页码: 149-159
ISSN:0162-1459
年代: 1964
DOI:10.1080/01621459.1964.10480708
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
It may be economically advantageous to both consumer and producer to enter into an incentive type contract in which the price paid for a product depends upon the outcome of an acceptance test. If no test is performed, a product of some minimum quality is produced and the consumer suffers a considerable penalty. The outcome of the test will reflect, to some degree, the quality of the product. If the consumer agrees to pay a premium dependent upon the outcome, the producer will be motivated to invest money in improving his product and both parties may expect to profit from the arrangement.
点击下载:
PDF (569KB)
返 回