THE DEFECTIVE DESIGN OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
作者:
KENNETH E. SCOTT,
期刊:
Contemporary Economic Policy
(WILEY Available online 1987)
卷期:
Volume 5,
issue 1
页码: 92-99
ISSN:1074-3529
年代: 1987
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00249.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Deposit insurance funds, especially the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, are currently in visible trouble. Two central defects of the existing deposit insurance system are identified: (1) mispricing of the insurance premiums and (2) incentives for both the industry and the insurance agencies to postpone recognizing and realizing losses.Insurance premiums are mispriced because they are assessed at the same rate for all institutions, which creates a bias for banks to take greater risks. Practical difficulties of setting an appropriate risk‐based premium for each bank are real but not necessarily insurmountable. In particular, the sale by the bank of unsecured and uninsured debt could provide a market measure of default risk, under a given failure rule.The choice of a failure rule is also a critical matter. Current failure rules are poorly defined and permit insolvent institutions to continue in operation. Specifying a market value test of insolvency in the statutes would be helpful, but it would have to be supported by market‐value accounting requirements and stronger pressures on banking authorities not to defer act
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