JUDICIAL REVIEW: A WAY OF CONTROLLING GOVERNMENT?
作者:
DAVID FELDMAN,
期刊:
Public Administration
(WILEY Available online 1988)
卷期:
Volume 66,
issue 1
页码: 21-34
ISSN:0033-3298
年代: 1988
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1988.tb00679.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Recent concern among administrators about the effect of judicial review on their work is exaggerated. The cases show that judges are aware of the pitfalls of too much judicial intervention. Judges do not control government. To understand their role, we must distinguish three different judicial techniques (here called directing, limiting and structuring) which are usually conflated under the title of ‘control’. In doing their jobs, judges generate principles to guide administrative procedures and judge their legality. That can make a useful contribution to structuring administrative decision‐making, but only if the civil service is as sensitive to the potential value of judicial review as judges are to its possible da
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