Incentives to cooperate in linear quadratic difference games
作者:
JOSEPHE. J. PLASMANS,
AART J.DE ZEEUW,
期刊:
International Journal of Systems Science
(Taylor Available online 1980)
卷期:
Volume 11,
issue 5
页码: 607-619
ISSN:0020-7721
年代: 1980
DOI:10.1080/00207728008967040
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
Linked macroeconometric policy models can often be regarded as linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum difference games. In this paper we study sufficient conditions for the Nash optimal strategies to be Pareto optimal.
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