VOTING AND IMITATIVE BEHAVIOR
作者:
Phillip Nelson,
期刊:
Economic Inquiry
(WILEY Available online 1994)
卷期:
Volume 32,
issue 1
页码: 92-102
ISSN:0095-2583
年代: 1994
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01314.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Political behavior generates private benefits by helping people fit in with desired friends. A voter imitates other voters, but at the same time they imitate him. An equilibrium solution requires exogenous variables: the narrow self‐interest of the participants. The reduced form makes one's vote a function of the narrow self‐interest of others as well as one's own. In accord with the model, a person's party identification depends on his ethnic group's current income and its income in 1909 as well as his own inc
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