Incentive schemes using the follower's strategies in differential games
作者:
TSUTOMU ISHIDA,
期刊:
International Journal of Control
(Taylor Available online 1985)
卷期:
Volume 42,
issue 4
页码: 839-854
ISSN:0020-7179
年代: 1985
DOI:10.1080/00207178508933399
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
We deal with Stackelberg games in which a leader has access not only to the state information but also to information on the follower's strategy. We derive sufficient conditions for incentive schemes using information on the follower's strategies in both linear and non-linear differential games, and show that the incentive schemes using information on the follower's strategies depend on an initial state value. We also derive a sufficient condition for the incentive scheme using the follower's strategy in the linear quadratic differential game with infinite time interval.
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