Oakeshott on the Authority of Law
作者:
RICHARD B. FRIEDMAN,
期刊:
Ratio Juris
(WILEY Available online 1989)
卷期:
Volume 2,
issue 1
页码: 27-40
ISSN:0952-1917
年代: 1989
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1989.tb00024.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Abstract.The author explains Michael Oakeshott's distinctive theory of law through an explanation of its notion of authority. He explains the view that modern states are ambiguous, consisting partly ofcivil associationsandpartlyofenterprise associations. Authority is not a function of people's attitudes to those in power, but exists when a government's action is itself accepted as sufficient reason for unconditional obedience. Authority in this sense cannot exist in enterprise association, commitment to which must be contingent on the fulfillment of purposes common to all participants. But modern states are compulsory associations, different from each. Furthermore, authority could never be justified on a rational choice model, which must always be teleological in character. Because this means there can be no solution to the problem of political obligation, all philosophy can do is describe abstractly the Rule of Law state which does reconcile authority and liberty.
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