Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
作者:
YEONGLING YANG,
期刊:
International Journal of Systems Science
(Taylor Available online 1993)
卷期:
Volume 24,
issue 7
页码: 1233-1251
ISSN:0020-7721
年代: 1993
DOI:10.1080/00207729308949556
出版商: Taylor & Francis Group
数据来源: Taylor
摘要:
This work considers the integration of quality and production responsibilities, and uses both quality and quantity as contracting attributes. The worker is better off with this arrangement not only through the increased compensation, but also through the job enlargement. In general the optimal contracts are strictly increasing in quantity and quality produced. Detailed comparative statics are derived for linearly additive production and quality-enhancing processes and power utility functions. It is shown that reductions in uncertainty and unit production cost, and increases in quality mark-up price and job-enlargement factors are encouraged by the principal.
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