A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
作者:
Michael Maschler,
期刊:
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
(WILEY Available online 1966)
卷期:
Volume 13,
issue 1
页码: 11-33
ISSN:0028-1441
年代: 1966
DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130103
出版商: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
AbstractAn inspector's game is a non‐constant‐sum two‐person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed.A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his
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