DesigningOptionalNo‐FaultInsurancePolicies forHealthCareSystems
作者:
David E. M. Sappington,
期刊:
Journal of Economics&Management Strategy
(WILEY Available online 1994)
卷期:
Volume 3,
issue 1
页码: 113-142
ISSN:1058-6407
年代: 1994
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00113.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Legislation to create optional no‐fault insurance (ONFL) programs has recently been enacted in Florida and Virginia. ONFI programs provide compensation to patients when certain medical complications arise, provided the patient agrees not to sue the doctor for additional damages. The optimal design of ONFI programs is explored in this paper, focusing on the incentive effects of ONFI programs. The question of whether ONFI programs should be funded entirely by participating doctors, or whether social subsidies are optimal, is examine
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