ABSTRACTThe paper examines J. Glover's 1970 account of the evasion of responsibility. Attention is focused on the Eichmann case and Glover's contention that moral condemnation of Eichmann depends on the view that there is a duty to submit one's actions to moral criticism. Two uses of the word ‘moral’ are distinguished (one use for moral commitment, the other for logical diagnosis) and it is argued that Glover's thesis is accordingly ambiguous. It is contended that Glover must either abandon his stipulative account of the concept of morality or accept the objectivity of moral judgements or modify his unqualified thesis that everybody ought to submit his conduct to moral criticism. An account of problems of evading responsibility involves us, it is maintained, in an area of moral philosophy, the Dialectic of Morals, where knock‐down arguments are s