Rights versus Underwritten Offerings: An Asymmetric Information Approach
作者:
ROBERT HEINKEL,
EDUARDO S. SCHWARTZ,
期刊:
The Journal of Finance
(WILEY Available online 1986)
卷期:
Volume 41,
issue 1
页码: 1-18
ISSN:0022-1082
年代: 1986
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04488.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
ABSTRACTBy assuming asymmetric information between investors and firms seeking new equity, we derive a rational expectations, partially revealing information equilibrium in which three forms of equity financing are observed. The highest quality firms employ a standby rights offers, intermediate quality firms signal their true value in the choice of a subscription price in an uninsured rights offer, while low‐quality firms remain indistinguishable to investors by making fully underwritten issues. The model offers justification for many firms using apparently more costly underwritten offers, provides a reason why firms using uninsured rights offers do not set arbitrarily low subscription prices to ensure the success of the issue, and explains the simultaneous existence of the three financing vehicle
点击下载:
PDF
(1021KB)
返 回