Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness
作者:
KATHLEEN AKINS,
期刊:
Mind&Language
(WILEY Available online 1996)
卷期:
Volume 11,
issue 1
页码: 1-43
ISSN:0268-1064
年代: 1996
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00027.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Abstract:InConsciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical views behind the empirical premises, and the hidden empirical arguments behind the derivation of the philosophical conclusion
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