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1. |
TheAcquisition ofRestructuredFirms: AnIllustration ofMarketDiscipline? |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 3,
Issue 4,
1994,
Page 585-603
James K. Seward,
James P. Walsh,
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摘要:
We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin‐off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin‐off announceme
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00585.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1994
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
Reputation, ProductQuality, andWarranties |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 3,
Issue 4,
1994,
Page 605-637
Nabil Ibraheem Al‐Najjar,
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摘要:
This paper studies the firm's choice between implicit and explicit contracts as alternative methods of assuring product quality. The relationship between these two contractual forms is studied using a dynamic model with imperfect monitoring and team moral hazard where both the firm and the consumer take unobservable actions that affect product performance. The firm chooses the contractual arrangement that maximizes expected profit. Identified are conditions on the primitive attributes of the transactions and on the firm's environment that can help explain why firms might decide to use explicit contracting, implicit contracting, or a combination of the two. I also show that there are conditions under which the introduction of reputation causes explicit contracts to be more uniform and less sensitive to the details of the transaction than implied by static models.
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00605.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1994
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
RenderingAlternativeOfferingsLessProfitable withResalePriceMaintenance |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 3,
Issue 4,
1994,
Page 639-662
Greg Shaffer,
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摘要:
When it was legal, resale price maintenance (RPM) was commonly observed on items such as aspirin, pens, pencils, toothpaste, soap, shaving cream, and milk. In providing a theory that is based on compensating retailers for their opportunity cost of shelf space, and that does not hinge on the existence of externalities in nonprice competition, this article explains why a manufacturer might impose RPM on these and many other products. By contrast, the use of RPM on food, grocery, and drug store items is not easily explained by standard theories such as free riding on presale services and quality certification by high‐priced retailers.The typical supermarket has room for fewer than 25,000 products. Yet there are some 100,000 available, and between 10,000 and 25,000 items aye introduced each year
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00639.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1994
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
PollutionRegulation andIncentives forPollution‐ControlResearch |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 3,
Issue 4,
1994,
Page 663-684
Gary Biglaiser,
John K. Horowitz,
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摘要:
We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution‐control technologies and to adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental regulations that both control pollution and provide incentives for research. Technology adoption standards are part of the optimal regulation. Another finding is that making the adoption standard stricter reduces researc
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00663.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1994
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
CompetitiveAdvantage andInternalOrganization: NucorRevisited |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 3,
Issue 4,
1994,
Page 685-717
Pankaj Ghemawat,
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摘要:
Why does the cost of organizing particular activities differ across competitors? This article explores in detail the organization of Nucor, a steel minimill that has sustained a significant cost advantage over its competitors. Nucor's past success highlights the complementarities among organizational policies and competitive advantage as well as barriers to the imitation of apparently superior organizational arrangements. The case study also suggests avenues for additional empirical and theoretical research.
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00685.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1994
数据来源: WILEY
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