摘要:

Manufacturers may intentionally damage a portion of their goods in order to price discriminate. Many instances of this phenomenon are observed. It may result in a Pareto improvement.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00149.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

It is generally believed that industries with greater product differentiation have higher rates of return. This paper shows that this effect breaks down in the presence of firm‐specific cost shocks. Greater substitutability in products generates two opposing effects: (1) it allows a larger increase in demand when a firm has a favorable cost shock, which more than compensates for the reduction in demand when it has an unfavorable cost shock, and (2) it results in more intense price competition. These two countervailing forces result in industry profit being highest in markets with a moderate degree of product differentiatio

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00175.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper examines the effect of a middleman on the search and trading behavior of the traders. It is shown that the buyer and seller types with middle valuations choose to search for each other, while the buyer and seller types with high or low valuations drop out of the search market and choose to trade directly with the middleman. The ask and bid prices of the middleman act as an outside option for the buyer and seller, and influence the outcome of the bargaining between the two. The model generalizes Gehrig (1993) by endogenizing the traders' search intensities, by allowing the traders to go to an intermediary even if thy have engaged in search, and by enabling the intermediary to provide the service of immediacy.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00195.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We present a model of industry evolution where the dynamics are driven by a process of endogenous innovations followed by subsequent embodiments in physical capital. Traditionally, the only distinction between R&D and physical investment was one of labeling: the first process accumulates an intangible stock, knowledge, while the second accumulates physical capital. Both stocks affect output in a symmetric fashion. We argue that the story is not that simple, and that there is more to it than differences in the object of accumulation. Our model stresses the causal relationship between past R&D expenditures and current investments in machinery and equipment. This causality pattern, which is supported by the data, also explains the observed higher volatility of physical investment relative to that of R&D expenditures.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00217.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long‐term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite hold

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00251.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper discusses the supplier power of medical specialists. We argue that a combination of factors, including the structure of health care delivery, reimbursement systems, the presence of option demand, and high consumer switching costs, create circumstances in which medical specialists may be able to exercise significant seller power. We explore the implications of this for the pricing and organization of medical care.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00277.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY