摘要:

Empirical work has failed to keep pace with recent advances in transaction cost theory and the theory of contract. The first econometric analysis of its kind is reported by using a new data set of small subcuntractors making specific inputs for customers in the engineering industry. The use of formal contracts is found to be strongly associated with specific investment and other variables measuring technological complexity and vulnerability to potential opportunism by customers. Furthermore, despite typically long‐term relationships, over half of subcontractors avoid making efficient, specific investments. Overall, we find strong support for the transaction cost theory of contract

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00257.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

A model of procedural decision making in firms is combined with an oligopoly model to study the effect of limited managerial cognition on firm flexibility. It is argued that a firm may vary its flexibility, and, hence, that there exists a trade‐off between decision‐making costs and costs due to imperfect adjustment to the environment. The main conclusions are the following: (1) The level of flexibility chosen by firms tends to be too low, from a social welfare point of view. (2) Entry reduces firm flexibility. Aggregated flexibility in the market may, however, increase in which case consumers are unambiguously better off. (3) Integration of isolated markets increases firm flexibility and consumer welf

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00279.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

While the economic approach to the politics of regulation emphasizes the importance of organized economic interests in shaping policies, political institutions in which regulatory agencies are embedded may also have significant effects. By including both economic influences and characteristics of political institutions in a model of price setting by state regulators, this paper demonstrates that both shape regulatory behavior in the telecommunications industry. Whether commissioners are elected or appointed, whether they face confirmation by a legislature, and whether a single party controls both executive and legislative branches of state governments influence the level of prices charged for basic services.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00301.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self‐selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by “other working conditions,” e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00325.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

I present an integrated survey of management strategy, which examines organizational design, competitive strategy, and public policy considerations. In addition, 1 offer suggestions on how economic analysis can be applied in unifying and developing management strategy as a field of study.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00355.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Books reviewed in this article:Economics, Organization and Management, by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00407.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY