ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00133.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00139.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Analysis of seven wholesale and retail markets for long‐distance telephone services since the AT&T divestiture indicates that service provider concentration declined in the later 1980s and then stabilized in the 2990–1993 period. In addition to this stability in market shares, a number of other conditions established since 1990 have been conducive to the development of market sharing rather than significant price competition. The most important of these conditions has been the tarifing process of the Federal Communications Commission by which MCI and Sprint replicate ATGT's price announcements. As market shares stabilized and became more equal, and as regulation formalized the price‐setting process, the price‐cost margins of the three large carriers increased and became more nearly identical. These results are consistent not with price competition but rather with emerging tacit collusion among AT&T, MCI, and

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00147.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This study examines the investment patterns of all large local exchange telephone companies in the United States over time. It identifies how different regulatoy environments have influenced the recent historical pattern of investment in modern infrastructure equipment. It focuses exclusively on the postdivestiture experience of local telephone exchange companies (LECs). It examines the growth of fiber‐optic deployment and of complementary equipment associated with the modernization of today's information infrastructure. The study estimates the influence of different regulatory structures on infrastructure deployment by LECs. The study is unique in that if relates individual LEC investment patterns to LEC‐specific regulatory, demographic, and economic characteristics. Thus, it isolates the contribution of state regulatory policies from that of other demographic and economic factors in the determination of infrastructure deployment at the state LEC rather than at the corporate level. Its main findings are as follows: First, price regulation (and, in particular, price caps) is a more potent regulatory mechanism than the standard earnings sharing scheme. Second, when associated with an earnings sharing scheme, price regulation is less effective in triggering infrastructure deployment than when it is implemented by itself. These results raise questions about the effectiveness of a popular regulatory instrument‐earnings sharing schemes‐and highlight the effectiveness of generic price‐cap regulation. These results have implications for the design of regulatory policy at both the state and federal levels. In particular, given the importance currently being placed on the development of the information superhighway, regulatory emphasis should be focused more on price regulation than on regulatin

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00187.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We investigate why different states in the United States choose different regulatory plans in their telecommunications industry. We present a simple theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the issue. We find that a state is more likely to replace rate‐of‐return regulation with incentive regulation when: (1) residential basic local service rates have historically been relatively high; (2) allowed earnings under rate‐of‐return regulation in the state have been either particularly high or particularly low; (3) the state's leaders tend to come from both major political parties, rather than from a single party; (4) the state's urban population is growing relatively rapidly; and (5) the bypass activity of competitors in the state is less pro

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00237.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple‐round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of allocating scarce resource

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00345.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper studies the hypothesis that large firms have more bargaining power with suppliers than do small firms, using data from the cable television industry. Employing techniques from the “new empirical lo,” the effect of owner size on marginal costs is inferred from the effect of owner size on observable product market choices. In the cable industry, the downstream firms decide how many subscriptions of cable to sell and how many channels to offer in the cable package. lf large firms have lower costs than small firms, then large firms should be willing to supply more than small firms, at all prices. The effects of bargaining power are identified separately from the effects of scale economies by exploiting the structure of the cable industry. Scale economies, in the cable industry, are likely to stem from regional size, while bargaining power is likely to stem from national size. By controlling for regional size, estimates of the effect of owner national size on the willingness to supply cable subscriptions and to offer channels indicate that large downstream firms offer significantly more subscriptions and channels at all prices than do small downstream firms. These results provide some of the first systematic, industry‐specific, evidence consistent with the bargaining‐power hyp

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00375.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY