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1. |
NonlinearPricing andOligopoly |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 4,
Issue 4,
1995,
Page 529-562
Lars A. Stole,
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摘要:
We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entr
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00529.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
BetterLate thanEarly: VerticalDifferentiation in theAdoption of aNewTechnology |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 4,
Issue 4,
1995,
Page 563-589
Prajit K. Dutta,
Saul Lach,
Aldo Rustichini,
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摘要:
After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low‐quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high‐quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the “incumbency inertia” hyp
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00563.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
ShareholderActivism, “Voluntary” Restructuring, andInternalLaborMarkets |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 4,
Issue 4,
1995,
Page 591-621
Gerald T. Garvey,
Peter L. Swan,
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摘要:
We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder “voice.” We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this “slack,” activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or “helping” between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to “pay” for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and “flat” pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of mana
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00591.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
VerticalContracts asStrategicCommitments: How areTheyEnforced? |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 4,
Issue 4,
1995,
Page 623-649
Cindy R. Alexander,
David Reiffen,
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摘要:
This paper addresses the strategic commitment value of various price and nonprice vertical contracts. Assuming contract offers are sufficiently public to have strategic importance, we focus on commitment as a necessary and separable condition to be met. The analysis has two components. First, considering the relationship between a monopolist manufacturer and his imperfectly competing retailers, enforcement conditions necessary for alternative vertical contracts to have commitment value are identified in the static (reputation‐free) context. It is shown that external help (i.e., enforcement by nonsignatories) is necessary for bilateral minimum resale price maintenance (price floors) and exclusive territory contracts to have commitment value, whereas maximum resale price maintenance (price ceilings) do not require such help (i.e., they are internally enforcing). Second, the paper provides an analysis of the U.S. case law and discusses the empirical validity of the “external enforcement” assumption that is shown to underlie recent proposals to make certain vertical restraints il
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00623.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
StableR&D Cooperation withSpillovers |
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Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,
Volume 4,
Issue 4,
1995,
Page 651-672
Katrien Kesteloot,
Reinhilde Veugelers,
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摘要:
The literature on the incentives for R&D cooperation with spillovers typically deals only with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focuses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative agreements in a repeated game framework. It is shown that the stability of cooperation is influenced by the nature and magnitude of spillovers, relative to the nature and degree of product market competition. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive (exogenous, unintended) know‐how spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our anslysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperation in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incenfives to cheat on the initial agreement, at least when firms produce substitutes. Alternatively, the possibility of technology sharing (i.e., intended or endogenous spillovers), besides R&D coordination, not only increases cooperative profits but also reduces the incentives to defect from a cooperative equilibriu
ISSN:1058-6407
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00651.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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