摘要:

This paper investigates how a designer of an organization (referred to as the regulator) should organize a production activity in which two different units produce components and where each unit has private information about its costs. Three organizational structures are analyzed. In the first(informational consolidation),the regulator contracts with a consolidated unit that produces both components. In the second(informational decentralization),the regulator independently contracts with the producer of each component. In the third(informational delegation),the regulator contracts with one of the units, which in turn subcontracts with the other. In each case, the regulator's optimal mechanism consisting of payment and output schedules is fully characterized. Informational consolidation and informational decentralization yield different output schedules. Under informational decentralization, the optimal output schedule may not depend on the sum of the marginal costs of each component, but when it does, the regulator strictly prefers informational consolidation to informational decentralization. Informational delegation is shown to be equivalent to informational decentralization when the regulator can observe the contracting between the units.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00237.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper proposes an empirical methodology for studying various (implicit or explicit) collusive behaviors on two strategic variables, which are price and advertising, in a differentiated market dominated by a duopoly. In addition to Nash or Stackelberg behaviors, we consider collusion on both variables, collusion on one variable and competition on the other, etc. Using data on the Coca‐Cola and Pepsi‐Cola markets from 1968 to 1986, full information maximum likelihood estimation of cost and demand functions are obtained allowing for various collusive behaviors. The collusive hypothesis is not rejected, and the best form of collusive behavior is selected via nonnested testing procedures. Using the best model, Lerner indices are computed for both duopolists to provide summary measures of market power. Finally, our approach is contrasted with the conjectural variation approach and is shown to give superior resu

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00277.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In the present paper, we relate the extent of job security offered to incumbent managers to the extent of competition among firms in the product market, where the extent of job security is measured by the probability that an incumbent manager continues to be employed by his current firm and the extent of competition is measured by the degree of differentiation between competing brands. We demonstrate that when competition between firms intensifies and “on‐the‐job training” is relatively more conducive to reducing the variable costs of production, firms tend to offer reduced (increased) job security to incumbent managers, provided that the degree of differentiation between competing products is sufficiently large (small), respectively. If “on‐the‐job training” is relatively more conducive to reducing the fixed costs of production, however, the previous res

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00313.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In this paper we attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail costs from those directly attributable to mergers. We estimate that cost reductions obtained from mergers ranged from a high of 33% for the Burlington Northern to a low of a 3% cost increase for the CSX. However, firms not engaged in significant merger activities experienced similar cost differentials indicating that consolidation was not a prerequisite for cost savings. We conclude that although mergers did confer some benefits on the participating firms, they were not a prerequisite for railroads being able to achieve substantial cost savings.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00339.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We analyze the implementation problem faced by firms when trying to collude in the face of asymmetric information about costs. Assuming that transfer payments are possible, we examine the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints that must be satisfied by any cartel agreement. Two scenarios are considered. Firms may or may not withdraw from the agreement after each firm's costs become known. If no withdrawal is possible, we find that the monopoly rule is implementable when weak types of individual rationality constraints are required. This contrasts with some results in the literature. If withdrawal is possible, we find a potential conflict between different forms of individual rationality constraints, in particular, between interim and ex post constraints. This conflict disappears in industries with a large number of firms.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00371.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper presents a model of strategic product choice when consumer preferences combine features of both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Consumers disagree on what amount of a “special” characteristic makes for a better product, but those who prefer more of this attribute are willing to pay more for it. Within this demand structure, I examine the advantages of first‐mover firms. I find that such firms typically do best in markets where the maximum degree of product differentiation is limited by preferences rather than technology. These are “niche markets”. Follower firms do better in markets in which the range of preferences is broad relative to the span of feasi

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00397.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00418.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY