摘要:

AbstractAgency theory suggests that, in imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders. Indicators of such managerial behavior may include expense preferencing in which some factor costs are elevated above optimal levels needed for efficient production or avoidance of optimal risk positions that maximize wealth opportunities for stockholders. This study of more than 6400 banks finds that recent reductions in legal entry barriers have generated results generally consistent with agency theory with a lowering of noninterest operating expenses, increased employee productivity, increased acceptance of portfolio risk, and greater dividend rates to shareholders.

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01321.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper empirically examines the explanatory power of investment banking reputation measures. One of these measures, a nineteen‐tier indicator of underwriter reputation, is determined by the relative position of the underwriter's name within the tombstone announcements of security offerings. An alternative measure assigns four ranks according to the investment banking bracket of the underwriter. This “bracket” measure is considerably easier to create than the “tombstone” measure. We employ both measures in identical initial public offering empirical models and assess their relative performance. In all of the models tested, the tombstone measure appears to be superior. Moreover, we find that, unlike the bracket measure, the tombstone reputation indicator significantly explains the initial returns to initial public offerings even when a measure of ex post uncertainty is included in

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01322.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper presents a model of management resistance to takeover bids in which there is both a managershareholder conflict of interest due to perquisite consumption and information asymmetry. The optimal response of shareholders to such resistance is then analysed. The paper highlights the role of information asymmetry and perquisite consumption in explaining the empirical evidence on takeovers and the institutional features of golden parachutes and greenmail.

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01323.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractMiller's clientele argument for market value subadditivity as an explanation for stockholder wealth gains in corporate spin‐offs and discounts from the net asset value of closed‐end fund shares is examined in the context of a simple state‐preference model. It is shown that binding short sales constraints induce value subadditivity and thus render Miller's clientele argument valid. This is true regardless of whether or not divergence of opinion among investors or state‐dependent utility functions exist. In the absence of binding short sales constraints, value additivity prevails and Miller's clientele argument is not viable. Although personal taxes are not considered in the model developed in this paper, it is shown that tax‐timing options reinforce the existence of value suba

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01324.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWithin a dynamic framework of capital growth and income generation, optimum capital structure of a firm is redefined under two alternative hypotheses. By the optimum control theory, it is shown that under conditions of perfect competition optimum equity/debt ratio of a firm can be uniquely determined in intertemporal maximization models of investor behavior. The result is new, but it is juxtaposed in the vast body of existing literature and finally compared with the Lintner‐Sau and Modigliani‐Miller mod

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01325.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis study examines the decision of regulated utilities to raise new financing via common stock, debt, or preferred stock offerings. We develop several logit models to test how a set of relevant variables affects the issuing choice. These variables include the level of insider ownership, regulatory climates, measures of aggregate market conditions, bankruptcy risk, deviations from the long‐and short‐term target ratios, asset composition, etc. In addition, this paper tests whether the cross‐sectional level of debt ratio is related to some of these same factors. Our findings indicate that U.S. electric utilities are not influenced by market timing when making a choice among long‐term financing instruments. However, our results do show that ownership structure variables, such as the number of directors and officers, seem to have a significant negative influence upon the choice of common stock, thus lending support to Friend and Lang's finding. In addition, capital structure seems to matter for ut

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01326.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWhen interest rates fluctuate, issuing long‐term debt may implicitly generate a valuable tax‐timing option. The holder of long‐term debt has an optimal‐trading taxtiming option to immediately realize capital losses if an increase in interest rates lowers the price of the bond below the original issue price. In contrast, if interest rates decrease and the bond price is greater than the original issue price, the holder would prefer to defer the realization of capital gains. This tax‐timing option confers an advantage for issuing long‐term debt. Our formal presentation also highlights how the tax‐timing options of long‐term debt may increase the debt capac

ISSN:0732-8516    

DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1992.tb01327.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY