ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00214.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractRecognition of the harms done by free speech is a function of the social ontology presupposed. An atomist ontology implies that the harms suffered are restricted to individual people. This paper suggests an alternate ontology—one that describes systems established by the causal reciprocities of their proper parts. It proposes a consequentialist moral theory, and considers the harms suffered by these systems (a) when speech exposes their internal, otherwise private, behaviors or features, (b) when speech is malicious and false, and (c) when speech is monopolistic. Does the proposed ontology have objectionable implications for public policy? Alternative answers are considered briefl

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00215.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper I distinguish two ways of using the expression ‘epistemological naturalism’. In one sense, naturalism amounts to a denial that epistemology should be understood as a kind offirst philosophyproviding the foundations for science from outside. In a second sense, naturalism holds that human knowledge is anaturalphenomenon and that epistemology should be seen as a chapter ofnaturalscience. Moreover, naturalism in this second sense usually incorporates some additional specifications that build up a very restrictive concept of science. Two different projects fornaturalizingepistemology lie behind these two meanings of ‘naturalism’, and the two projects, although sometimes seen as complementary or even equivalent, are not necessarily so. After drawing this distinction, I set out the difficulties faced by those naturalistic stances that do not discriminate sharply enough or do not establish the appropriate hierarchical relationship between both projects. Finally, I argue for a conception of epistemology which is best described as aradical antilfoundntionnlism.This conception sticks to the requirements that follow from naturalism when understood in the first sense above, and takes the cluster of theses that give birth to the second as subsidiary and re

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00216.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractEpistemology has traditionally sought to discover the foundations of knowledge. Recently, anti‐foundational philosophers have construed epistemo‐logy's failure to discover an ultimate ground to indicate the bankruptcy of foundational theory. On closer examination, however, the history of epistemology reveals the aim of foundational theory to be different both from the reductive ideal of its traditional defenders and from the unsystematic relativism that its recent critics offer instead. An alternative history of foundational theory reveals a progress toward multiple necessary foundations which is the task of epistemology to articul

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00217.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis essay compares and contrasts pragmatic naturalism with the more well known position of epistemological naturalism on several pivotal issues, in the process offering a pragmatic critique of the latter. It highlights their common rejection of both foundationalism anda priorimethods and their positive claims that: what needs examination is not our concept of knowledge but knowledge itself; knowledge must be understood as tied to the world and as a natural phenomenon to be examined in its natural setting; the epistemic endeavor involves unifying its three traditional projects of giving an account of what knowledge is, explaining how knowledge is possible, and providing useful epistemic advice, thus involving normative considerations; and the method of gaining knowledge in general is continuous with the method of science. Yet, there are very great divergences between the two naturalisms concerning the answers offered, and these are explored and evaluated in the development of the essay.

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00218.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe basic tenets of “classical” naturalism (exemplified in the work of Mead, Buchler, and Randall, among others) are delineated and distinguished from other versions of naturalism. Classical naturalism is also distinguished from reductive materialism and idealism. Nature is asserted to be indefinitely plural and not amenable to monistic or dualistic categorial schemes; that is, the principle of “ontological parity” is maintained. The method of inquiry of naturalism is outlined, along with the notion of truth as perspectivally objective. The metaphysical hypotheses are then used to examine culture. Culture is found to be the specific environment of human being, arising out of, but irreducible to, other natural processes. Culture is described as the cumulative gestures of the human social organism as it discovers and creates itself in mutual constitution with other natural processes and p

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00219.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00220.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00221.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0026-1068    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00222.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY