摘要:

This paper presents an economic analysis of the organ procurement system in the U.S. and examines proposals to alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. The paper's principal conclusions are: (1) Although non‐market solutions deserve the highest priority, demand increases fueled by improvements in transplant technology will probably make some market‐based solution necessary in the future. (2) Quality deterioration and coercion will not necessarily be worrisome problems under a market‐based procurement s

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1990.tb00047.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund enforcement program is examined to test the hypothesis that change in the political environment contributes to implementation failure. Agency achievements are evaluated under two enforcement strategies: a Burford strategy dominated by the Reagan administration deregulatory agenda and a Ruckelshaus/Thomas strategy that is more in keeping with the Agency's initial pro‐regulatory legislative mandate. The latter strategy is found to be more effective in terms of quantitative and qualitative enforcement outcome measures. This supports the conclusion that the systematic intrusion of deregulatory politics into enforcement strategy formulation contributed to Superfund failur

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1990.tb00048.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The paper considers how implementation strategies for the promotion of innovation implicate the forms of law in Western economies. Pursuing the example of computer software production, it traces the tension in the form of the law between liberalism and corporatism, property and administration, and rule and discretion. It examines developments in the law relating to copyright, proprietary information, trade practices, foreign investment, and government sponsorship and enterprise.

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1990.tb00049.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 put government on an equal footing in tort law with private individuals. It also provides a very broadly defined immunity for any public function of a discretionary nature. While economists argue that immunity does not minimize social costs, this analysis outlines a theoretically optimal mix of liability and immunity. Discretionary governmental policy must be immune as it establishes principles of government conduct. Tort liability then insures cost‐minimizing policy execution. This theory of state behavior links a number of leading/controversial immunity cases that otherwise exhibit no consistent though

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1990.tb00050.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY