ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00099.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Regulatory change is driven by competitive struggle. Regulatees struggle with each other for customers and with regulators to lessen the burden of the rules being enforced. Regulators compete for regulatees and for the confidence of customers and the general public.Competition among regulators is imperfect. Along with better rules, new entrants must offer reputational capital, financial strength, and recognized enforcement powers. These entry requirements have supported a secular expansion of government suppliers relative to private suppliers. Principal‐agent conflicts inherent in representative democracy establish incentives for this expanding sector to produce regulatory services of poor quality. Finding ways to make top government regulators economically accountable for acts of misregulation is a critical proble

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00100.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00101.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00102.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper considers business adaptation to legal regulation from an enforcement perspective. It is argued that regulatory agencies and business have a reflexive relationship in which there is a continual process of adaptation and readaptation by one party and then the other. This reflexivity and its implications are discussed with reference to socio‐legal research into the regulation of occupational health and safety and environmental pollution in England and Wale

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00103.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The material in this article is extracted from an empirical study of industrial and agricultural businesses' responses to regulation of health and safety in the workplace. The study critically assesses the philosophy of self‐regulation which underpins the regulatory framework in England and within the context of the expectations of employers built into that philosophy, attempts to distinguish between different models of employers in relation to their levels of motivation toward health and safety issues; their knowledge and comprehension of the law; their general approach to compliance with regulations; and their response to inspectors' enforcement activities. The article concludes that self‐regulation is only capable of operating under very narrow conditions. It is at its most successful within the largest and most hazardous companies, despite the fact that the inspectorates devote the greatest concentration of enforcement and advisory resources to these sites. Companies which do not have a natural interest in safety require considerable advice, encouragement and coercion. In some situations deterrent penalties may be required in order to achieve a sustained improvement in standards. The research suggests that greater attention should be paid to the variety of employers and their compliance strategies, and to the potential for better targeting of regulatory effo

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00104.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00105.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00106.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This chapter presents an economist's perspective on the interrelationship of the compliance and enforcement decisions of business and regulators in the context of regulations governing occupational health. Assuming profit‐maximizing firms and harm‐minimizing enforcement agencies, it is argued that a degree of preventive activity would be undertaken by businesses even in the absence of regulation. However, if employees are not fully informed about the risks of the workplace, it is likely that the profit‐maximizing level of prevention will be less than socially optimal, and consequently there will be a need for regulation. An enforcement agency which attempts to minimize harm through inducing compliance with regulatory standards will be faced with similar informational difficulties to individual employees, and this suggests some scope for cooperative gains with individual firms through negotiated compliance, rather than prosec

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00107.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00108.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY