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1. |
Editor's Introduction |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 13,
Issue 4,
1991,
Page 259-261
HAROLD C. BARNETT,
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PDF (152KB)
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ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1991.tb00070.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1991
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
Regulating Risky Business: Dilemmas in Security Regulation* |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 13,
Issue 4,
1991,
Page 263-295
NANCY REICHMAN,
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PDF (1899KB)
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摘要:
This paper examines the dilemma of regulating the complex and highly differentiated stock market. I argue that regulations, with legitimacy needs for status neutrality, serve mostly to protect investors with limited capacity for managing risk on their own. In competitive markets, players with greater capacity for risk management (e.g., access to market intelligence, sizeable reserves to cushion losses and enhanced technologies for risk assessment) seek out new arrangements for managing risk. These new privatized forms of risk management interact with the markets and market regulation in ways that undermine the regulatory program for those who depend on it most. I illustrate this form of regulatory bias by examining events surrounding Black Monday, the stock market crash of October 1987.
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1991.tb00071.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1991
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
Private Ordering, Self‐Regulation and Futures Markets: A Comparative Study of Informal Social Control* |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 13,
Issue 4,
1991,
Page 297-326
NEIL GUNNINGHAM,
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PDF (1708KB)
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摘要:
This paper describes an empirical study of futures market regulation in three jurisdictions: Chicago, Hong Kong, and Sydney. It focuses on private ordering and argues that informal mechanisms of social control have been crucial in maintaining market “order” and curbing trading abuses. Peer group pressure, fear of being ostracized, the leverage of large institutional clients, the transparency of certain market dealings and the opportunities this provides for “pay back” between “repeat players”, have been far more important in ordering behavior than the remote and often unenforced rules imposed either by government or the exchanges themselves. It is suggested that to understand “crime in the pits” we should focus on criminogenic structures which facilitate fraud through specific combinations of opportunity and risk. It is also structural factors which substantially account for the relative success or failure of private ordering in constraining trading abuses in di
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1991.tb00072.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1991
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
The Banking Crises and Housing Finance: The Political Economy of Financial Deregulation* |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 13,
Issue 4,
1991,
Page 327-342
RICHARD McINTYRE,
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PDF (891KB)
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摘要:
This paper explains current problems in the housing and banking industries by reviewing the history of the post‐New Deal U. S. banking system as it relates to housing finance. Current problems in banking and housing are seen as the result of the interaction of long waves of growth and decline in the U.S. economy and structured conflict over financial regulation between large commercial banks and a shifting alliance of other social groups. Contemporary problems of affordability, price volatility, and credit “crunches” flow from increasing financial fragility and economic stagnation. Policies to democratize finance and create new financial institutions are consi
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1991.tb00073.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1991
数据来源: WILEY
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