ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01037.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01038.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01039.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe importance of the ‘concerted action’ as an instrument of controlling the economic process is generally overestimated and its drawbacks are often over‐looked. Some of the most conclusive causes thereof are discussed in this article. A more intensive policy of growth and structural change is proposed and the government advised to keep reserve in cooperating with the big associa

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01040.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYEverywhere Man acts purposefully, undesired secondary effects can take place. In the first section of this article the problem is exposed giving examples out of nature and society, whereas in the second section its importance for the economic policy is argued on. Undesired secondary effects until now have been discussed along two lines: as practical cases in specific historical situations and as optimality rules for using policy means. In the third section W. A. JÖhr's rule—developped 1947—is derived mathematically supposing cardinal measurement of utility. A figure shows that with intensifying the application of a policy measure, four phases can be discriminated: absolute and relative underdose, and relative and absolute overdose. In the forth section some practical problems are discussed and therefrom a justification for the ‘piecemeal approach’ is

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01041.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYIn the ‘Economic Theory of Politics’ the model of pure democracy has the same importance as the model of perfect competition in economic theory. The author shows that both ‘ideal’ models use almost identical assumptions with respect to social actors (vote‐, profit‐, and utility‐maximizers) and social states. Both guarantee a Pareto‐optimal allocation of resources. In the equilibrium of a two party democracy the same programs are advanced and put into reality. It follows that in equilibrium (and only there) nobody votes. Extensions of the simple two‐party model to include various parties and induced preferences of voters by the parties destroy some of the simple results: sometimes no equilibrium exists, it is unstable or does not conform to observations of reality. Finally, democracy's allocation with generally more equal distribution of income than through the price system, is destroyed when the declamatory assumption of ‘one man—one vote’ is given up and the inequality of political starting positi

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01042.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe formal brilliance of the neoclassical theory of economic growth cannot compensate the fact that its definition of capital is not convincing. The objections JoanRobinsonalready made in 1953 have never been definitely cleared, whether by operating with a homogenous good to avoid the index number problem, nor with the surrogate production function Samuelson derivated from the neoclassical original production function. JoanRobinson's argument that the definition of capital is already presupposing the distribution of income which should be derivated thereof, is not covered by the index number problem; Samuelson's surrogate production function is only applicable with limited suppositions. Thus, two corner‐stones fall out of the neoclassical structure: (1) capital is no given amount of a factor but its value depends on wage‐rate, labour input and gestation period of investment. This will withdraw the basis of the neoclassical axiom, i.e. that supply of factors determines the growth over the system of relative prices. The choice of the most profitable technique will be the key instrument of growth theory. (2) Distribution of income cannot be derivated from a production theoretical context, either of the factor prices must be determined exogenously. How this is done, will be a problem of political econ

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01043.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThis paper starts by examining why demand curves are not as useful in the analysis of public as of private goods. It is argued that the ‘quantity’ of most public goods amounts to what is usually called a ‘quality’ measure. Because of this, and for other reasons developed in the paper, it is fruitful in the analysis of public goods to deal directly with the total amount individuals would pay for changes in public good provision, rather than with the average amount per unit change. A demand curve‐like construction, dubbed an ‘aggregate bid curve’, is shown to be a useful tool. The aggregate bid is the precise meaning of ‘benefit’ in benefit cost analysis. It is conjectured that, under certain assumptions, all of the conditions of efficiency, with and without public goods and externalities, can be derived using agg

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01044.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYIn this paper the voting behaviour on public finance issues is examined. The authors presuppose that individuals do reveal their true preferences in referenda and that, therefore, it is possible to explain their underlying utility calculus. For this purpose different cost concepts are introduced: (1) private opportunity costs (benefits from alternative private expenditures), (2) public opportunity costs (benefits from alternative public expenditures), and (3) expected tax increases. Having analyzed theoretically the weight these different cost categories have in the utility calculus of the voters of different income classes, the determinants of the utility of public projects are examined. The results of this theoretical reasoning are tested empirically in the last part of the paper by using poll‐data from the canton Basel‐Stadt (Switzerland). On the whole the empirical tests confirm the derived hypothe

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01045.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe present article deals systematically with the objections against the traditional manpower‐approach. The result thereof is a catalogue of variably urgent research aims. The wide‐spread pessimism concerning the possibilities of methodically extending the manpower‐approach thereby turns out to be at least premature. The traditional manpower‐approach is very inflexible. It is based on the assumption of a predetermined expansion of final demand and labour productivity and takes coefficients as fixed. This means among other things that political decisions —like determining the teacher/pupil‐ratio or the share of research workers among total personnel—cannot be changed. In the article is outlined how to overcome these shortcomings. Allowing for decision margins in dividing up the labour force between the production of consumption‐ and capital‐goods and between education and research poses difficult theoretical and statistical problems; but it does not fundamentally make impossible the application of the

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01046.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY