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1. |
THE TERMS‐OF‐TRADE EFFECTS OF DEVALUATION UPON REAL INCOME AND THE BALANCE OF TRADE |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 418-452
Fritz Machlup,
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摘要:
SUMMARYThe question how currency devaluation would affect the net terms of trade has been debated for many years, chiefly because one wanted to know what this change in the terms of trade would do to real national income, and also how this income change in turn would alter the trade balance. Yet, changes in the net terms of trade can have determinate effects on real income only if the productivity of resources is unchanged, and devaluation usually affects productivity through the resource reallocation which it induces; indeed, where there is no such reallocation the net terms cannot be affected by devaluation. Hence, even if the net terms should be adversely affected by devaluation, this may be associated with an improved use of resources which raises productivity enough to cause real national income to be increased rather than reduced. A deterioration of the net terms of trade may sometimes be a pre‐condition for an increase in real national income as well as for an improvement in the balance of trade. The presumption is strong that the devaluation of an overvalued currency will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. The contention that a deterioration of the net terms of trade will normally cause a reduction of the real national income and a worsening of the balance of trade by equal amounts must surely be rejected.The conceptual identity between real output and real income cannot be maintained when the terms of trade change. Clear analysis of the problems under discussion requires distinctions between “real output”, “real intake”, and “real income”. If the idea of a “change in therealbalance of trade” is to make sense, it must relate to the difference between changes in real domestic output and real domestic intake. The socalled “primary burden” of devaluation may be interpreted as the fall in real intake when real output and terms of trade are unchanged; if there is any “secondary burden”, it need not be another reduction in real intake, but rather a reduction in real income. Since real output and real income may move simultaneously in different directions, it becomes necessary to ask on which of them the spending propensities—investment, consumption, imports, hoarding—are based. Depending on the incidence of changes in “income”, it will sometimes be real output, sometimes real income that will determine expenditures. Yet in most algebraic model
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01360.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE TASK OF THE ECONOMIC HISTORIAN* |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 453-460
W. H. B. Court,
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摘要:
SUMMARYFirst the article points out the excellence and the limitations of Professor Ashton's volume of a new economic history of England and gives his definition of its task: to find answers to the questions which economists ask or should ask of the past. What are these questions and can they be answered for England in the eighteenth century? The problems of economic growth: An adequate treatment of these would require a fuller picture and a more complete analysis of English society between 1700 and 1800 than Professor Ashton permits himself. The structure of the book tends to lean towards questions of economic organisation without much reference to long‐term change and recent controversies among economists. The social consequences of industrialization are of much interest to the general historian and the politician, but they are similarly handled with a marked economy of discussion. The old melodramatic history of the Industrial Revolution is discarded here, but the picture of a society in process of violent economic change remains undrawn; this is perhaps to be done in a later volume.Professor Ashton's book represents a reaction against old general views but avoids the substitution of new ones. The present position of economic history calls however not only for a critique of interpretations, but also for reinterpretation. The special difficulty of economic history lies in the need somehow to reconcile the economist's and sociologist's need to analyse in terms of general concepts with the historian's duty to recreate from original sources the unique historical situation which it is his wish to narrate and to explai
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01361.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
NOUVEAUX ASPECTS DE LA THÉORIE DES PRIX ET DE LA PRODUCTION* |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 461-474
M. F. Capet,
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摘要:
SUMMARYNew Aspects of Price and Production Theory. Despite recent progress, price and production theory is still inadequate, because it is not applicable to the management of business enterprises and it cannot be used in macro‐economic models. What is needed is not the refinement of a few special points in the theory, which suffers from the defect of narrowness, but rather an effort to extend its scope, particularly in the following respects:(a) Investigation of such relations as may exist between markets or between industries;(b) Specification of the production functions;(c) The working‐out of a theory of organisations, which would make it possible to grasp and express, in simple terms, the differences that are to be expected in the behaviour of a co‐operative society and a share company, a trust and a cartel a free and a dependent enterprise, etc.;(d) Investigation of cases falling somewhere between a duopoly and a polypoly— the only forms which really exist—detailed treatment being given to the possible reactions of enterprisers (price changes, advertisements, participations etc.), and the result being systematised on the basis of a new logical principle, which, to all appearance, can only be the one underlying the theory of games.It looks as if we are now upon the brink of such an extension of the theory. This would constitute the second “revolution” of the price and production theory. The bookBusiness Concentration and Price Policyreviews the stage now reached by research with regard to a large number of important points, such as:‐ the concept of industry,‐ investigation of yields,‐ the extent of concentration and degree of integration of business firms,‐ the incidence of taxes,‐ the tactics of imperfect competition,‐ the relations between markets.Although it suffers from want of systematic arrangement, the book nevertheless supplies a great many data necessary for the elabor
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01362.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
A GENERALIZATION OF THE FOREIGN TRADE MULTIPLIER* |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 475-491
Hans Brems,
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摘要:
SUMMARYFictitious Centralism in large enterprises. In order that each of the threads of an increasingly complicated business enterprise may be kept in hand, they are all actually made to converge at the highest level. But this centralisation is fictitious; for, in reality, it leads to an overburdening of the man at the top, who is thus rendered incapable of performing his proper function—namely, to take decisions. Instead, he becomes the weakest link in the routine.Imperfect delegation, i. e., the delegation of matters for treatment without simultaneous surrender of competence, condemns those in the middle grade to subaltern standing, in which they too are unable to take any decision or assume the responsibility that goes with the taking of decisions. The typical result is that nobody decides, that—to exaggerate slightly—the life of an industrial concern is controlled not by definite volition but by the law of cause and effect.Imperfect delegation is one of the causes of the hypertrophy and sluggishness of the internal bureaucracy of business concerns. The fact of clinging to theoretical powers which in reality are not exercised has, for instance, the result that the modern forms of accounting practice not only fail to give the internal life of a big enterprise the elasticity and commerciality which they quite well could have given it, but, instead, lead to a multiplication of bureaucratic processes.The negative effects of the fictitious centralism which distinguishes the industrial system from the great organisations of the past (e. g. the ancientpolisand the feudal state, both of which tended to delegate too many rather than too few functions) are certainly well known, yet it seems impossible to overcome it. This fact is only to be explained in the light of the history of ideas (“Geistesgeschichte”). From his predecessor, the capitalistic entrepreneur, the present‐day manager has taken over the automatic equation of what he does with work, and the consequent justification of his social position in his own eyes and those of society. This attitude, which was alien to most of the leading groups in history, prevents him from extricating himself from the vicious circle which he has got into as the result of fictitious
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01363.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
FIKTIVER ZENTRALISMUS IN DEN GROSSUNTERNEHMUNGEN* |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 483-491
Hans Paul Bahrdt,
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PDF (545KB)
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摘要:
SUMMARYFictitious Centralism in large enterprises. In order that each of the threads of an increasingly complicated business enterprise may be kept in hand, they are all actually made to converge at the highest level. But this centralisation is fictitious; for, in reality, it leads to an overburdening of the man at the top, who is thus rendered incapable of performing his proper function—namely, to take decisions. Instead, he becomes the weakest link in the routine.Imperfect delegation, i. e., the delegation of matters for treatment without simultaneous surrender of competence, condemns those in the middle grade to subaltern standing, in which they too are unable to take any decision or assume the responsibility that goes with the taking of decisions. The typical result is that nobody decides, that—to exaggerate slightly—the life of an industrial concern is controlled not by definite volition but by the law of cause and effect.Imperfect delegation is one of the causes of the hypertrophy and sluggishness of the internal bureaucracy of business concerns. The fact of clinging to theoretical powers which in reality are not exercised has, for instance, the result that the modern forms of accounting practice not only fail to give the internal life of a big enterprise the elasticity and commerciality which they quite well could have given it, but, instead, lead to a multiplication of bureaucratic processes.The negative effects of the fictitious centralism which distinguishes the industrial system from the great organisations of the past (e. g. the ancientpolisand the feudal state, both of which tended to delegate too many rather than too few functions) are certainly well known, yet it seems impossible to overcome it. This fact is only to be explained in the light of the history of ideas (“Geistesgeschichte”). From his predecessor, the capitalistic entrepreneur, the present‐day manager has taken over the automatic equation of what he does with work, and the consequent justification of his social position in his own eyes and those of society. This attitude, which was alien to most of the leading groups in history, prevents him from extricating himself from the vicious circle which he has got into as the result of fictitious
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01364.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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6. |
THEORIES OF CONTROLLED CAPITALISM |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 492-507
Arthur Schweitzer,
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摘要:
SUMMARYRecent theories of capitalism concentrate upon the defects of markets. The theories of Karl Polanyi and Bruno Seidel are examined in this article. In a broad survey of economic history since the middle ages, Polanyi concludes that the whole economic market system destroys the substance of society and creates disadvantages for all groups. Yet disintegration was halted through the principle of social protection which comprises all forms of collective economic actions, whether by groups or states. Yet, the author has failed to give a specific market analysis which would indicate how specific disadvantages arise in the process of pricing. The all comprehensive “social protection” contains so many diverse elements that one cannot infer from the principle how interventions have reformed the market system of capitalism.In his analysis of industrialism and capitalism, Seidel sees a conflict between the industrial and capitalist elements of our economy. Capitalist elements have been “tamed”, while we have been unable to control the industrial elements. Modern technology has become independent of capitalist property and markets. Industrialism has been economically beneficial and socially disintegrating. Deconcentration of large concerns and decentralization of large cities are proposed as necessary reforms. Interventions in markets spring from cartels of producers, organizations of farmers, unions of laborers, and the interference of states. The multitude of interventions is developing into a planned capitalism. The result of these interventions has been a greater degree of equality in the economic and social relationships among men. Control of capitalism was achieved through introducing social‐ethical principles into the economy.The newer version of the defect theory limits control of the market system to the most recent period, and states some of the reasons why organized groups control their markets. The theory of social protection is limited in its scope; its economic, political and social impact upon capitalism is traced in detail. Yet missing is still a theory of deficient markets as well as of controlled markets. The future task of economic research is to provide an analysis of the different market sectors controlled by groups, of the monopoly of concentrated property, of the specific nature of social protection, and the economic role of big government in controlled c
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01365.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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7. |
LE PROBLÈME DE L'UNION ÉCONOMIQUE: L'EXPÉRIENCE BELGO ‐ LUXEMBOURGEOISE* |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 508-510
Fernand Baudhuin,
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ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01366.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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8. |
BESPRECHUNGEN COMPTES RENDUS ‐ REVIEWS |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 511-539
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PDF (1851KB)
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摘要:
HansAlbert.Ökonomische Ideologic und politische Theorie.MauriceAllais.Traité d'économic pure.EgonErnestBergel.Urban Sociology.AdolfA. Berle, Jr.The Twentieth‐Century Capitalist Revolution.RenÉD. Bollier.Die These einer chronischen Dollarknappheit.FranÇoisBoudot.La coopération en FranceArnoldGehlen.Urmensch und Spätkultur.H. D. Henderson.The Inter‐War Years and Other Papers.JeanMarchal.Cours d'économie politique.JacquesMilleron.Étude sur l'économie espagnole.EugeneRotwein(Ed.):David Hume — Writings on Economics.PeterScherrer.Die Terms of Trade und die Beschäftigung.HansJÜrgenSeraphim.Theorie der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftspolitik.HansThorelli.The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition.W. S. Woytinskyand E. S. Woytinsky.World Commerce and Governments ‐
ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01367.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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9. |
BIBLIOGRAPHIE |
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Kyklos,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1956,
Page 540-542
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PDF (133KB)
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ISSN:0023-5962
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1956.tb01368.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1956
数据来源: WILEY
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