摘要:

SUMMARYThe central issue in this paper is the effect of alternative property rights on the flow of innovation. The basis for this issue arises from the fact that people prefera wider range of choices to a narrow one. The analysis is broken down into: the freedom to innovate, the power to innovate, the incentives to innovate, the implementation of innovation, and the evaluation of innovation. The line of reasoning in the paper is exampled by reference to the Yugoslav economy. The paper concludes that an essential problem of economic development is the freedom to search for and adopt a set of social institutions within which opportunities and incentives for innovation are enhanced. Specifically, labor participation in managementcollectivizesinnovation, a purely individual phenomenon, andalienatesthe innovator from its outcome. In comparison with a private‐property, free‐market economy, self‐management reduces the number of potential innovators, their power to innovate, and incentives to inn

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00784.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe paper analyzes risk allocation in large‐scale resource ventures. High set‐up costs, a long gestation period of ten years and more and a high financial risk are characteristics for large‐scale resource ventures. Financial risk is the result of economic risk (price risk, cost risk), technological risk (innovation in extraction, exploration) and political risk (taxation schemes, extraction rights). Large‐scale resource ventures represent an interesting case of risk allocation in which many players are involved. Institutional arrangements for risk allocation in large‐scale resource ventures are interpreted as a complex net of contractual relationships between different players. The paper analyzes a theoretical framework in which risk allocation is studied. Policies of risk shifting for the individual agent and institutional arrangements for risk shifting in the case of large‐scale resource ventures are studied. The net of relations between different players is a check on the strategic behavior arising from idiosyncratic problems and thus reduces co

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00785.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe recognition of the existence of imperfect information in decision‐making and the cognitive limitations of the human mind put various assumptions of the neoclassical economic paradigm in doubt. Neoclassical economists responded by arguing that decision rules, or rules of thumb, can be used to render decision without processing information. Further, neoclassicists have suggested that rational rules compete against and drive out irrational ones. This paper focuses on the use of rules of thumb and posits that the empirical evidence about the rationality of these rules is dubious and that they logicallycannotserve as a basis for rational conduc

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00786.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYIn this paper we argue that mutual altruism might explain why workers and a firm move from low‐productivity adversarial point(s) to high‐productivity cooperative point(s). The unique critical level of such altruism is identified and hence a stopping rule is provided: The mutual altruism solution to an otherwise prisoner's dilemma equilibrium depends on representing an agent's (workers, firm) preferences as a specific convex combination of his and the other agent's original utilities. The move to the cooperative point(s) is facilitated by revision of the utility functions and a consequent change in the payoffs. This, in turn, is brought about through intrafirm processes such as furnishing employees with superior compensation packages as well as through an interfirm process ‐ drawing lessons from ‘shocks’ ‐ the experience of firms which, as they were locked in low productivity equilibrium points, were

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00787.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYIn periods of demographic change, pay‐as‐you‐go financed social security systems imply transfers of lifetime income not only among generational cohorts, but also between families of different size and generational composition. Whereas previous models of voting on social security in democratic societies focused on the first type of transfer and assumed homogeneity of interests within each generation, we treat the family as the relevant decision‐making unit. It is then analyzed how the results of majority voting on public pension and sickness funds depend on the rate of time preference, the overall rate of population growth and the distribution of children across families. Not surprisingly, opposition to mandatory social security turns out to be greatest when children are most unevenly dist

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00788.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer Beitrag untersucht die Bedeutung von Ansätzen der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie für die Erklärung der Protektion in Industrien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Nach einer Darstellung der theoretischen Grundüberlegungen folgt ein kurzer Überblick über empirische Untersuchungen zu Bestimmungsgründen der Protektion in der Bundesrepublik. In einer ökonometrischen Untersuchung werden dann Modelle geschätzt und getestet, die als endogene Variable das Niveau der Gesamtprotektion einer Branche und als exogene Variablen eine Reihe von Grössen, die in Modellen der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie für relevant erachtet werden, enthalten. Wichtige Ergebnisse sind: Ein mit den theoretischen Überlegungen übereinstimmendes und statistisch signifikantes Vorzeichen ergab sich für den Konzentrationsgrad (positiv), den Wertschöpfungsanteil am Output (negativ) und den Importdruck aus Entwicklungsländern (positiv). Entgegen einer früheren Untersuchung für die Bundesrepublik ist jedoch die Richtung des Einflusses der Anzahl der Firmen und der Beschäftigten statistisch nicht gesichert und umgekehrt wie in den theoretischen

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00789.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00790.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00791.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

BARRO, ROBERT J.:MakroökonomieBayerische Rückversicherung AG (Hrsg.):Gesellschaft und UnsicherheitBERGSTRÖM, VILLY; HONKAPOHJA, SEPPO and SÖDERSTEN, JAN (eds.):Growth and DistributionBLAUG, MARK:Great Economists before KeynesBOITEUX, M.; DE MONTBRIAL, TH. et MUNIER, B. (eds.):Marchés, Capital et IncertitudeBRAUN, WOLFRAM:Die Organisation ökonomischer AktivitätenCNOSSEN, SIJBREN:Tax Coordination in the European CommunityCOFFEY, PETER:The European Monetary System ‐ Past, Present and FutureFEIWEL, GEORGE R. (ed.):Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic TheoryGHOSH, RATNA and ZACHARIAH, MATHEW(eds.):Education and the Process of Social ChangeGLAESER, BERNHARD (ed.):EcodevelopmentHERI, ERWIN W.:Die GeldnachfrageJÄGGI, CHRISTIAN M.:Die Makroökonomik von J. M. KeynesMEADE, JAMES E.:Alternative Systems of Business Organization and of Workers’ RemunerationMINAMI, RYOSHIN:The Economic Development of JapanRAMSER, HANS‐JÜRGEN:VerteilungstheorieRAVALLION, MARTIN:Markets and FaminesROLOFF, OTTO und WILD, WERNER:Umweltschutz in öffentlichen BudgetsSARGENT, THOMAS J.:Dynamic Macroeconomic TheorySTAUSS, BERND:Grundlagen des Marketing öffent

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00792.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00793.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1987

数据来源: WILEY