摘要:

AbstractIn previous papers on dynamic incentive contracts, the dynamic structure of the principal‐agent relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about the hidden information over time. In this paper we deal with a different source of dynamics, which is considered standard in all areas of economics other than the information literature: we study situations where current opportunities depend on past and current actions, notwithstanding any information conveyed by the actions. Standard examples include investment, “Learning by doing”, and R&D. In order to focus on this neglected source of dynamics, we restrict our attention to situations involving asymmetric information in each period, but without any intertemporal informational correlation, so that no dynamic effect arises directly from informational asymmetrie. This makes comparisons with static results both easier and more intere

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00052.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe standard interpretations of Ricardo's theory of foreign trade assume that money ˙is neutral and conclude that the terms of trade cannot be determined since reciprocal demands are not taken into consideration. In Japan, however, Kojima and Morita emphasized the role of non‐neutral metallic money and insisted that Ricardo can determine the terms of trade without introducing the reciprocal demands. A model is constructed to show that their arguments using numerical examples are. justified and that Ricardo's theory has conditional determinacy of the terms of trade without explicitly considering reciprocal deman

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00053.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper provides a formal model in which incumbent managers and workers sign a labour contract in the face of takeover pressures. We consider the possibilities: (i) workers can enhance their productivity by making an investment in specific human capital; (ii) a raider and workers will renegotiate the original contract after a takeover; and (iii) both the incumbent managers and the raider are concerned about their own reputations for being trustworthy in their contract arrangements. The main result shows that under certain conditions, a threat of takeovers forces the incumbent managers to select fewer investments in specific human capital even before a takeover although the incumbent managers have no incentive to behave opportunistically in the absence of takeover threats.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00054.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWe consider the problem of choosing an alternative in a pure public goods economy with feasibility constraints when voters have “additively‐separable and single‐peaked”preferences.Our purpose is to identify tops‐only voting procedures satisfying “nonmanipulability” and “voter sovereignty”. First, we show that such procedures are generalizations of the schemes of “voting by committees”1)introduced by Barbera, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) in the sense that these procedures are defined similarly for the generalized feasible set. Second, we establish that when no two goods can be simultaneously produced at their maximal feasible levels, the procedures are characterized by the existence of

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00055.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to extend a monopolistically competitive trade model with symmetric costs to one with asymmetric costs in product diversification. Both the trade pattern and the effects of the opening of trade on welfare are examined. It is shown that: (1)the larger country will be a net importer of differentiated products, which contradicts the result of Krugman (1980); (2)the greater the size of the country, the smaller is the share of the intra‐industry trade, and (3)the larger the trading partner of a country, the larger are the gains from trade of the country. Some of these results duplicate those from recent studies. However, our results are based on asymmetric costs. In particular, (3) suggests that the presence of increasing‐returns‐to‐scale technology does not always imply that the large country gains from its large

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00056.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal investment decision of the firm with a vintage production function. First, the optimal conditions for the investment and replacement permitting jumps in the state variables are derived. Second the effects of exogenous parameterson investment are examined and the following new results areobtained: (1) whether a rise in the current money wage increases or decreases investment depends crucially on the time profile of the existing plants; (2) a rise in the rate of technical progress reduces investment.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00057.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper deals;with a situation where a quality‐setting Cournot firm and a price‐seeting Bertrand firm coexist in the same industry. Under a set of regularity conditions on demand and coast, we compute equilibrium prices on Cournot‐Bertrand “mixed”duopolies, and compare them with those of “pure” Cournot and Bertr

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00058.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper we propose the concept of an affine cost‐share equilibrium and show that under natural assumptions any optimal allocation corresponds to an affine cost‐share equilibrium. With linear cost functions and under mild regularity assumptions we show that an optimal allocation is a ratio equilibrium with redistribut

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00059.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractModelling the retailers' behaviour explicitly, I extend the model of manufacturer returns policy of Flath and Nariu (1989) by introducing general demand conditions under uncertainty. I derive an equivalence theorem between manufacturer acceptance of returns and resale price maintenance (RPM) under conditions of zero marginal cost, risk neutrality and symmetric information. This was first shown by Marvel and Reagan (1986) in a somewhat different context. I also discuss some differences between RPM and return policy under asymmetric information and risk attitudes.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00060.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper deals with a situation where a quantity‐setting Coumot firm and a price‐ setting Bertrand firm coexist in the same industry. Under a set of regularity conditionson demand and cost, we compute equilibrium prices on Cournot‐Bertrand “mixed” duopolies, and compare them with those of “pure”Cournot and Bertr

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00061.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY