摘要:

We consider a two‐sector model of intertemporal resource allocation in which the investment good sector exhibits an initial phase of increasing returns in production. The economy maximizes a discounted sum of one period utilities derived from the consumption good. If it is autarkic, it may face a poverty trap from which it cannot escape even if it follows an optimal policy. If it engages in trade with the outside world as a price taker, it may escape from the trap. The optimal patterns of production and trade are analysed for such an econom

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00012.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper investigates the impact of antitrust policy on the strategic choice of product specification when firms can collude with respect to prices, cannot collude with respect to location and may have their collusion ended if it is detected by the antitrust authority. Depending on the aggressiveness of the antitrust authority, different location configurations may emerge in equilibrium. Extremely aggressive and extremely lax policies lead to the least efficient outcomes while the configuration maximizing social welfare is obtained by an intermediate policy.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00013.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper investigates the impact of antitrust policy on the strategic choice ofproduct specification when firms can collude with respect to prices, cannot collude with respect to location and may have their collusion ended if it is detected by the antitrust authority. Depending on the aggressiveness of the antitrust authority, different location configurations may emerge in equilibrium. Extremely aggressive and extremely lax policies lead to the least efficient outcomes while the configuration maximizing social welfare is obtained by an intermediate policy.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00014.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00015.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper presents an investigation of the endogenous timing in multi‐stage duopoly games in which duopolists choose two variables over two periods. The paper elaborates the two‐stage strategic commitment game discussed by Brander and Spencer (1983). Duopolists decide their outputs and cost‐reducing investments and they are allowed to choose which action to take first. The paper discusses two types of games; one is a three‐stage game in which each duopolist can commit to the order of choices before it chooses its output or cost‐reducing investments, and the other is a two‐stage game in which it cannot. The paper finds that at least one firm chooses its output first. Furthermore, the three‐stage game has the unique equilibrium outcome in which both firms choose their

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00016.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper builds on a model by Mikami (1991) to explore the effects of uncertainty on the producer's choice of product quality when (1) quality influences demand price and (2) producers are not risk takers. It is shown that even risk‐neutral producers might make different quality choices under uncertainty and that those choices will depend upon the explicit way in which uncertainty influences the demand pric

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00017.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Within models of traded and nontraded goods, that ignore international factor mobility, the literature on tariff reform has established sufficient conditions under which a policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the second highest (lowest) rate, or a policy that moves proportionally all tariffs to a given number improves welfare. The present paper generalizes previous studies by introducing perfect international capital mobility. It demonstrates that if all goods are normal in consumption and the nontraded good markets are locally Walras stable, then a reform policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the next highest (lowest) rate improves welfare if (i) the good with the highest (lowest) tariff rate is a net substitute to all other traded goods, and (ii) the nontraded goods are net substitutes to all other goods. Second, a policy reform that moves all tariffs to a given number is always welfare improving.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00018.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff‐ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota‐restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff‐ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign‐capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital‐intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff‐ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00019.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00020.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00021.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY