ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00037.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00038.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00039.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In this paper we present a simple game form implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes, which has nice stability properties. we show that if the preferences of eaach consumer are representable by a utility function of the form a(y)xi+bi(y), where xi(y), where xiis the amount of private good and y, the amount of public good, then the Nash equilibrium of our geme is locally stable under the gradient adjustment process. This restriction on the preferences has been known in hte literature as the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimal amount of pukic goods to be independent of the private goods distribution. This type of preference includes quasi‐linear preferences as a special case. but unlike quasi‐linearity, this allows a non zero income effect of demand for public goods as well as private goods, which is often supported by empirical evidence. Our result shows how an equilbirium can be achieved over time by a decentralized strategy adjustement process for a fairly general class of environments, even in the absence of a dominant‐strategy equili

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00040.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Recent research has been motivated by the fact that the outcome function in implementation may not be “credible”. On the one hand, the players may try to renegotiate the final outcome, if there is another outcome which they prefer. On the other hand, the “social planner” may have an incentive not to implement the finaloutcome, if there is another outcome which he prefers. I show that in the exchange economy, the first problem is not serious. a planner with unlimited commitment power can design a “collusion‐proof” mechanism, which is stable against all sorts of group devciation, including theex posttrade of goods among the agents. I will, However, argue tha hte second problem (the planner's commitment problem) can be

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00041.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In addition to thenaturalrequirement in mechanism design proposed by Saijo, Tatarmitani, and Yamato (1995a), we introduce the simple punishment condition that requires thesamefeasible punishment whenever all participants simultaneously become potential deviators. First, we fulkly characterize the class of social choice correspondences (SCC's) implemented naturally with the simple punishment condition. finally, the Walarasian correspondence and the individually rationla and efficient correspomdence ar enaturally implementable by using the initial endowment as a simple punishment in the case of at least three participants.

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00042.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper describes a statistical model of equiliobrium behaviour in games, which we call Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). The key feature of the equilibrium is that individuals do not always play responses to the strategies of their opponents, but play better strategies with higher probability than worse strategies. we illustrate several different applications of this approach, and establish a number of theoretical properties of this equilibrium concept. We also demonstrate an equililance between this equilibrium notion and Bayesian games derived from games of complete information with perturbed payoffs

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1352-4739    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00044.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY