摘要:

This paper explores the extent to which insights available from existing writings on directly unproductive profit‐seeking (DUP) activities in international trade modify rules of tax and tariff reform in normative public economics and examines in what way these should affect advice on tax policy usually given to developing countries.The analysis proceeds by developing two models. The first incorporates revenue seeking directly into a standard open economy public finance model and examines whether analysis of policy reform and economic costs of distortionary tariffs must be modified. The second includes a political component in the form of lobbying for subsidies – the expenditure side of the budget – as well as a normative economic component that raises taxes – the revenue side – to finance the social costs of such lobbying. The model can be used to determine the effects of politically determined expenditures on tax setting.The analysis shows that the grammar of welfare‐theoretic arguments that underlies the reform and design of tax and tariff structures is robust to the inclusion of DUP activities of the type considered here. In particular, the latter lend no presumption in favor of uniformity in tax and tariff structures. It is argued that existing policy advice on tax and tariff reform derived from models where DUP activities have traditionally played no role continues to be appropriate when account is taken of formal treatments of DUP‐type phenomena extant in the curre

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00014.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

It is widely believed that the free‐rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that benefit the public at large may defeat a candidate who depends on the support of special interests. Moreover, even if the latter candidate can win, he must use a publicity strategy which allows any voter to hear of proposals that benefit groups other than the voter'

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00015.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper provides new tests of the recently developed theory of rational partisan business cycles. According to the theory, resolution of uncertainty about electoral consequences and partisan differences in economic behavior produce downturns following victories of conservative parties and booms following victories of liberal parties. The first tests utilize the behavior of financial markets to reassess the evidence for the United States. We provide evidence that the stock market does have predictive power for output and estimate an econometric relationship which is then used to gauge the extent to which the recessions are anticipated after elections. The second test uses an international sample of democracies in the postwar era to examine the theory outside the United States using time series models and political variables. The results of the tests provide little support for a strict interpretation of the theory.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00016.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy maker: aggregate welfare versus industry profits, output and imports; and trade barrier revenue versus industry profits and domestic price. In all cases considered, performance contingent protection which takes the form either of a tariff which depends on domestic output or a quota which depends on the price charged is generally superior to a fixed tariff or quota and is sufficient to achieve optimality.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00017.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00018.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00019.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY