摘要:

This paper asks what constrains the relative efficiency of a maximally decentralized form of public ownership of capital. It locates the answer in the nondecentralizability of common ownership. Relative inefficiency in the allocation of investment funds is predicted because the ability to arrange a private portfolio gives rise to incentives to investigate investment alternatives and to monitor the disbursers of investment funds, and these incentives cannot be replicated in a system in which (political) voice is the sole mechanism for instilling financial and managerial accountability. Implications for the design of public ownership systems are discussed.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00075.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper tests a simple asset market model of campaign contributions, using data from recent U.S. Senate races. When applied to “investor” PACs, the model performs surprisingly well, and suggests that the contributions market is relatively efficient. When applied to “ideological” PACs, political parties, and individuals, the model is rejected. The results not only provide empirical support for the model, but also point out important differences in the apparent motives behind different types of contri

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00076.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We construct a model that takes seriously the role of bureaucracy in the characterization of time‐consistent policies. We argue that if the possibilities for governments to reduce the size of bureaucracy are limited, bureaucracy can be used as a means for influencing future governments. We show that the political process has implications for the size and growth of bureaucracy. Parties in power may hire bureaucrats of the opposite political color. This is a part of the time‐consistent policy. Our model also gives an explanation for the growth of bureaucracy. This is a consequence of the time‐consistent policies, i.e. policies that partially tie the hands of future governments. We also show that if public sector production is inefficient, the public sector will be too large in the long run. In the short run it may be too

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00077.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We study dominant strategy mechanisms where the planner knows the distribution of types and the agents are instructed to announce their types to the planner. It is assumed that the planner has access to a technology of inspection which is costly but perfect, and that he can penalize an agent who is inspected after announcements have been made if he is found to have lied about his type. It shall be shown that, in general, the welfare‐maximizing mechanism that respects minimal equity will induce some agents to lie about their type

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00078.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The purpose of this paper is to present a model in which the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime is envisaged in a political setting. We consider a country whose voting population comprises three types of agents, importers, exporters and speculators, who select their position on exchange rate policy according to welfare maximization. As a result, well‐defined interest groups are shown to emerge. Each coalition makes contributions to one of two political candidates running for political office in support for their optimal policy intervention. When policy pronouncements by the two candidates are made in terms of exchange rate volatility, the equilibrium consists of two extremes: a fixed versus flexible exchange regime, the latter with bounded volatility [JEL D72, F31

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00079.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We develop a model of political support seeking politicians and support supplying voters. Based on Downs' original formulation, the framework yields endogenous political weights with both liberal and conservative properties. Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self‐interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns. We show that the “altruistic” aspect of government behavior is consistent with its “self‐interested” behavior. We determine that the Olson‐Becker pressure group model is not unique. An increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy. Smaller groups receive a larger per capita subsidy. These results are consistent with B

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00080.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY