摘要:

European monetary unification (EMU) ‐ the creation of a single European currency and a European Central Bank ‐ is both an economic and a political phenomenon. Yet few studies have attempted to address simultaneously the political and economic dimensions of the process. In this introduction, we review and extend the relevant literatures. The evidence leads us to conclude that EMU is driven mainly by political rather than economic factors, although our understanding of even these political forces remains incompl

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00069.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) treaty signed at Maastricht does not guarantee the recreation of German‐style economic policies and outcomes at the European Community (EC) level. Membership was not limited to countries that mimic the German commitment to price stability. National representatives may outvote inflation‐averse EC central bankers in monetary policy decisions. The Council of Ministers has the power to set exchange rate policy vis‐à‐vis third currencies. The treaty does not provide binding constraints against fiscal profligacy in member states. The German government agreed to this suboptimal outcome because in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and German unification it had broader political interests in maintaining the pace of European integration at Maastricht. The Bundesbank's policy of high interest rates in 1992, however, has effectively guaranteed a two‐speed monetary union, in which the first group of members will be limited to a narrow deutschemark zone. Given the waning enthusiasm for integration across the EC, the German government has no incentive to alter th

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00070.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

European progress toward monetary union takes place within the highly institutionalized setting of the European Community (EC). This paper examines the ways in which formal institutions and decisionmaking procedures have constrained the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process. The EC's structure has both created demands for and facilitated cross‐issue linkages, and these linkages characterize the successful bargaining on EMU. However, success also requires ratification. Domestic ratification procedures and changes in the EC's context of linkage have created challenges for the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. Ratification is also tied to concerns about democratic accountability, which arise from current legislative procedures and are the subject of ongoing institutional refor

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00071.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper addresses two questions: (1) Is a twelve‐country monetary union in Europe feasible? (2) Can monetary union be achieved at multispeed, i.e., with a small group of countries going first, and later admitting the others? After examining several politico‐economic arguments concerning problems of feasibility of the union, we conclude with a fair amount of skepticism concerning the multispeed idea. We show that the final result of the process of monetary integration is dependent upon the number of countries that initiate it. Our discussion of feasibility sheds some light on the political economy of the recent (Fall 1992) turmoil in the monetary system of Eur

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00072.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The European Monetary Institute (EMI) will prepare a framework for European Monetary Union (EMU) monetary policy during the transition to the EMU. This involves a trade‐off between deepening financial market integration and harmonizing central bank instruments, a choice between centralized and decentralized monetary strategies with significant welfare implications, and a trade‐off between expected welfare and certainty of policy outcomes. As a result of being dominated by national central bankers and of the conflict between the core and the periphery of the European Community (EC), the EMI is biased toward an inefficient solution. Enlargement of the EC by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) group would raise the probability of a more efficient, two‐track EMU, which initially would involve only the core

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00073.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

A common currency, as envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, is thought to be the surest way to “lock in” commitments to monetary cooperation among sovereign states. But historical evidence suggests otherwise. Comparative analysis of six currency unions demonstrates that while economic and organizational factors are influential in determining the sustainability of monetary cooperation, interstate politics matters most. Compliance with commitments is greatest in the presence of either a locally dominant state, willing and able to use its influence to sustain monetary cooperation, or a broad network of institutional linkages sufficient to make the loss of monetary autonomy tolerable to each part

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00074.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY