摘要:

This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a “benevolent planner,” who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a “Leviathan planner,” who places more weight on the utilities of “favored consumers.” The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare‐improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing al

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00007.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00008.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry‐specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the absence of government intervention, firms in imperfectly competitive markets change the level of trade and DFI in response to future protectionist threat

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00009.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper presents some general‐equilibrium models of the parallel market in centrally planned economies. The models are based on the hypotheses that private firms can operate more efficiently than bureaucratically‐run state enterprises and that Soviet‐type economies are characterized by price controls and quantitative allocations. The state's enforcement policy is explicitly modeled. Although the welfare implications of the parallel market for workers are ambiguous in general, under a variety of circumstances they turn out to be negative. For instance, responding to the shortage created by price controls, illegal firms divert resources from the official economy into the parallel market. The result is a higher price in the parallel market without any increase in the total supply of the

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00010.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) demonstrated the interesting possibility that once revenue seeking is introduced the Metzler paradox may arise even for a small country: that is, a tariff will decrease the output of the inportable good. In this note, we establish the conditions under which the Metzler production paradox will arise and discuss the relation between the importable‐good and the exportable‐good production parado

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00011.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

John E. Roemer,Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00012.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House, 1987; and Joshua S. Goldstein,Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00013.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY