摘要:

AbstractSubjects had five encounters with trained confederates, who each displayed five patterns of gaze with different subjects, in a graeco‐latin square design. The patterns of gaze were: Zero, looking while talking, looking while listening, normal and continuous. Two conditions were used: Subjects were either getting acquainted with the confederates or assessing them while they behaved in an ingratiating manner. Subjects and confederates were either both male or both female. Subjects rated the confederates on fifteen rating scales; a principle components analysis produced five main components, the first two being liking/evaluation and activity/potency. Gaze affected scores on these components as predicted: Ratings of liking/evaluation increased from zero gaze to normal and were lower for continuous — confirming the affiliative balance theory; and the more gaze the higher the ratings on activity/potency. The predicted effects of ingratiation on the interpretation of gaze were not obtained, though ingratiators were seen as less intelligent. Decoders responded to amount of gaze, and not to its relation to talking and listen

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040202

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe literature on status congruency is summarized in two statements: 1) Individuals strive after status congruency, and 2) status congruency involves favorable state for individuals, groups and the society. The two reported experiments throw serious doubts on the generality of these statements.Experiment I is a variation of Burnstein and Zajonc's (1965) experiment. It is hypothesized and shown that the striving after congruency is weakened under condition of a competitive reward structure, the Ss giving incongruent self‐rankings. Moreover it is found that nominations for a different task are not congruent at all.Experiment II was designed to replicate and extend Exline and Ziller's (1959) experiment, in which it was shown that status congruency in small groups causes interpersonal conflict. On none of the several measures was clear support obtained.In the discussion it is argued that there is hardly any experimental evidence for the two statements formulated above. It is pointed out that the correlational relationships between status congruency and other variables may be attributed to some internal cognitive link in the person, serving as an intermediate variable, the forces of it perhaps being self‐interest (as supported by Experiment I), a need for clarity and a need for just

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040203

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractImplicitly or explicitly, linkage is a basic concept in all theories of cognitive consistency — consistency or inconsistency can exist only with reference to entities which are cognitively linked through association or dissociation. The nature of cognitive linkages has not been systematically studied, but it seems evident that they may vary in many ways. One is the strength or intensity of perceived relationship between cognitive entities. The basic hypothesis in the present two experiments was that the effect of a communication in terms of attitude change would depend on the strength of linkage between concepts mentioned in the message. Results show no such effect when strength was manipulated through combination of linkages, whereas the hypothesis was confirmed when linkage strength was varied semantically. Also, previous studies on direct and mediated generalization of attitude change towards consistency were successfully replicated. Finally, it was found that amount of attitude change towards consistency was significantly higher for linkages involving affect (L‐relations) than for linkages simply expressing unit formation (U‐relat

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040204

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe main supporting evidence for Rokeach's theory of prejudice (the Anticipated Belief Differences Theory of Prejudice) comes from the strong belief effects obtained in a simple Race/Belief manipulation. Analysis shows that the theory is unfalsifiable with this paradigm and is therefore neither tested nor confirmed by the many studies purporting to do so. The Belief‐undefined/Belief‐partially‐defined manipulation of Stein, Hardyck and Smith (1965) does test the theory. However, these authors' conclusion that favourable evidence was obtained is incorrect owing to the use of an inappropriate statistic.Although race effects can be incorporated within a theory of belief prejudice it is equally possible to incorporate belief effects within any theory of prejudice which is contingent on an initial categorization into in‐group and out‐group. An empirical distinction between Rokeach's theory and other theories of prejudice can be made using a Belief‐undefined/Belief‐partially‐defined manipulation. Finally the theoretical adequacy of Rokeach's theory is discussed in terms of more general characteristi

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040205

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractTwo central hypotheses of the original version of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) (1) that dissonance is to be conceived of as a primary drive and (2) that in order to reduce dissonance less resistant cognitions will be changed more than highly resistant ones led to hypotheses which were confirmed by two experiments.In Experiment I, a 2 × 3 factorial design, order and familiarity of dissonance reduction modes were manipulated. After receiving a dissonant information the subjects were offered a relatively low and a relatively high resistant cognition for dissonance reduction, each being placed first (series I, high‐low resistance) or last (series II, low‐high resistance) respectively. Subjects did (known) or did not (unknown) read these modes before reacting to them. Under the unknown condition dissonance will be reduced more with a specific mode if it is placed first than last. With known reduction modes the order of presentation does not have an effect. Under series I condition the first‐placed, higher‐resistant cognition will be changed more in the unknown condition than in the known condition. Under the series II condition the first‐placed, lower‐resistant cognition will be changed equally in the known and unknown condition. In short, the higher‐resistant cognition will be changed more, only when it is placed first and when the following modes are not known.Two explanations for these results are possible: (1) The more dissonance is reduced by changing a more or a less resistant congnition, the less further reduction is necessary; (2) dissonance will be reduced in an internally consistent way. Experiment II excluded the first explanation. Subjects were allowed to revise their original way of reducing dissonance. First, subjects in one condition received series I unknown and subjects in the other condition received series II unknown. Reacting to the dissonance reduction modes the second time, there was more revision when the high‐resistant congition was placed first (series 1 revision) than when placed last (series II revision). These results support the hypothesis that dissonance reduction by changing a less‐resistant congnition more and changing a high‐resistant one less is preferred.Implications of the results of the two experments for the stability of dissonance reduction, the method and interpretation of dissonance exper

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040206

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe effects of discussion on subsequent group and individual choices are studied in a situation where subjects choose between a sure gain of varying amount and five probability levels associated with larger gains of expected value equal to that of the sure gain. At the end of the experiment, a single bet, chosen at random, is played for money. Before discussion, subjects have to guess the percentage of similar, more risky and more cautious choices made by their peers for each of the six bets. As predicted by a majority‐rule decision‐making model significant risky shifts were observed for relatively low values of sure gain. For higher values, however, groups tended to be more cautious than individuals. The final private choices of individuals were significantly more risky than their initial decisions. Most individuals apparently thought they were at least as risky as most others. This finding was due, however, primarily to the responses of subjects who chose the highest risk‐level (the ceiling effect) and, secondly, to the consistent tendency of most individuals to guess that others make the same choices as they themselves. It is concluded that majority influence seems a satisfactory explanation of group risky shifts observed in the present study, but it cannot account for modifications of group and individual choices in all risk‐taking sit

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040207

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040208

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040209

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420040201

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1974

数据来源: WILEY