摘要:

AbstractThe importance of synchronic consistency as a factor facilitating minority influence had not previously been the object of a systematic study. We carried out a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 experiment aimed at studying the consequences of a) ideological similarity or dissimilarity of two minority sources belonging to b) a single minority or two different ones, on subjects c) ideologically both close and distant from positions defended by the influence sources, d) according to the absence or presence of psychologization. In the main, our hypotheses were confirmed. As expected concerning the ‘close’ subjects, in the absence of psychologization, the similarity and dissimilarity between minority sources take over, respectively, the signification of consistency and inconsistency and, consequently, increase or decrease the influence exerted by the minority sources. Psychologization decreases the benefits of synchronic consistency. Contrariwise, the ‘distant’ subjects did not seem to follow the same ‘logic’: the condition of opinion dissimilarity in the same minority is the most influential; its influence, however, diminishes when the divergence of opinion is explained by means of a psychological dissimilarity. Data related to the image of the sources indicate that the influence process is no longer determined by perceived consistency or inconsistency, but by the objectivity attributed to minorities. Under these circumstances, intra‐minority pluralism became the guarantee

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200202

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractTwo experiments investigated the role of majority size (social pressure) in minority influence. Opposite predictions were derived from an attributional account and two social impact models. In Experiment 1 there was a tendency for minority influence to decrease with increasing majority size when the minority argued against gay rights. The results were stronger and clearer in Experiment 2. For pro‐abortion minorities, the minority's impact clearly declined as the size of the opposing majority increased. As predicted by the social impact models, this decline occurred during the initial increase of the majority size. The limitations of the mathematical models are discusse

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200203

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this article, a theoretical distinction is proposed between representative outgroup minorities (representative of a minority category in the society, e.g. gays) and dissident outgroup minorities (defined as a minority subgroup within a larger outgroup category). Two studies are reported comparing the social influence of dissident outgroup minorities with that of ingroup minorities (belonging to the subject's own social category). It was predicted that a position advocated by a dissident outgroup minority would be more readily accepted than that of an ingroup minority, but that the ingroup minority would be more likely to elicit the generation of new, alternative solutions. A first experiment in which subjects were either exposed to an ingroup minority, an outgroup minority, or no influence source confirmed these predictions. In a second experiment, subjects were either exposed to a majority or to a minority source either belonging to the subject's own social category or to the outgroup. The results indicate that the position of an ingroup majority was readily accepted whereas the otherwise identical message of an outgroup majority was rejected; neither ingroup nor outgroup majority stimulated the development of alternative proposals. Again, in line with Nemeth' (1986a) theory, the position of an ingroup minority was rejected but stimulated the generation of new, alternative proposals. The differential role of social category membership in minority and majority influence and the applicability of Nemeth' (1986a) theory to the attitude change area are discussed.

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200204

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe present research was designed to identify types of events in everyday life that people regard as unjust and to find a meaningful structural representation of these types of events. Two hundred and eighty descriptions of unjust events were collected from various student samples using different methodologies. Interestingly, a considerable proportion of the injustices which were reported did not concern distributional or procedural issues in the narrow sense but referred to the manner in which people were treated in interpersonal interactions and encounters. An intuitive classification of the descriptions by two experts led to 22 different types of unjust events. Subsequently, a sample of 84 descriptions was selected and sorted by naive subjects into similar groupings. The grouping data were then subjected to cluster and multidimensional scaling analyses. A nineteen‐cluster solution reproduced the intuitively defined main types of unjust events very well. An eight‐cluster solution, which provided the most meaningful higher level grouping, and the MDS results indicated that a meaningful structural representation of types of injustices has to consider the particular content of unjust events as well as the social setting where they occur. With regard to the latter aspect, injustices in task‐oriented relationships of unequal power and impersonal short‐term encounters are distinguished from injustices occurring in personal, long‐term, social‐emotional relationships of

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200205

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractFour experiments were conducted to demonstrate that embarrassment and shame are distinct emotions that result from violations of different types of internalized standards. Embarrassment results from violating one's particular persona; shame results from violating a shared, objective ideal. Subjects vividly imagined themselves in situations and indicated their emotional reactions. In Experiment I, we demonstrate that people differentiate between embarrassment and shame systematically (F(1,27) = 74.4, p<0.001). In Experiments 2 and 3, we demonstrate that embarrassment results from violating a persona (n = 34, p<0.001; n = 23, p<0.001), and shame results from violating an objective ideal (n = 34, p<0.001; n = 23, p<0.001). In Experiment 4, we demonstrate that it is the type of standard that is violated (n = 30, p<0.001), not whether or not the violation was intentional, that determines whether one experiences embarrassment or shame. We argue that both shame and embarrassment play an important role in maintaining personal identity.

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200206

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper describes an innovative investigation of commonsense conceptions of emotion using a two‐person game where one player asked questions intended to determine the nature of an emotional state imagined by the other player. All questions used by players were then sorted into categories by expert judges. Based on cluster analysis, questions were categorized as relating to ‘causes’, ‘characteristics’, and ‘consequences’ of emotional states. Potential advantages and applications of this technique

ISSN:0046-2772    

DOI:10.1002/ejsp.2420200207

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY